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PREFACE 
Texas experienced relative peace within its boundaries during the 
Civil War. Once the war ended, with General Robert E. Lee•s surrender 
to General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House, for the Lone Star 
State the real war began. Racial tensions, experienced during the great 
conflict between the Blue and the Grey, emerged with renewed vigor. 
Vehemently, the same angry forces which had preyed on their enemies, 
either real or imaginary, struck again. Prior to 1865 whites targeted 
European and Mexican immigrants and Unionists for violence. Those same 
whites had kept black slaves in check despite emancipation. After 1865 
Anglos transferred their hatred and aggression to all who were not 
ex-Confederates, white Southern Democrats, or "true" Texans. 
Presidential Reconstruction established a provisional government 
(June 19, 1865) and military occupation (August 20, 1866) for the Lone 
Star State. Federal officials forced Anglos in Texas to accept full and 
immediate freedom for blacks instead of gradual and limited 
emancipation, which most white Southerners favored. Denied states• 
rights, Texans fought back by means of covert action. With the birth of 
the Ku Klux Klan, the hooded disguise of the secret organization gave 
many white Texans sanction to intimidate, terrorize, and even murder. 
iii 
By doing so they hoped to regain control of their state at least 
politically. Socially and economically, the Klan managed to keep the 
freedpeople subservient and to maintain them as a source of cheap, often 
free, labor. 
With the introduction of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 
Abandoned Lands, ex-rebels called on the Klan to threaten and 
assassinate Union troops and bureau agents. Radical Republicans and 
Congressional Reconstruction added one more target for Klan destruction. 
By 1868, Texas, from the Red River on its northern boundary to the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Rio Grande on the south, experienced Klan and 
Klan-like terror. Klansmen and their co-conspirators murdered thousands 
of blacks, Mexicans, European immigrants, loyalists, and federal troops 
and agents. Despite army efforts to rid Texas of crime, the military 
proved ineffective as a policing agent. State delegates and legislators 
were too strongly divided among themselves to enact any positive 
measures to deal with the lawlessness or the plight of the freedpeople. 
The violence continued long after the final draft and acceptance of a 
state constitution and the readmission of Texas to the Union in 1870. 
Known Klan membership in 1872 still numbered 15,000 to 20,000. 
Even after the Republican governor, E. J. Davis, had been replaced 
by the Democrat, Richard Coke, in 1874, Klaverns still continued their 
nightly ghostly raids. The killing continued throughout 1875 and 1876. 
With the compromise of 1877, human rights and civil liberties for Texas 
minorities, especially for blacks, would be only a vision for which to 
hope and dream for years to come. 
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CHAPTER I 
SETTING THE STAGE 
Scholars of Southern history such as Charles William Ramsdell and 
E. Merton Coulter maintained that secret societies promoting white 
supremacy during the era of Reconstruction, particularly the Ku Klux 
Klan, were prominent only in the regions of the deep South. According 
to these interpretations, states such as Texas, located on the outer 
perimeter of the South, had no problem with Klan violence. Further, 
these historians discounted and simultaneously denounced the "armed 
organizations" which identified themselves as Ku Klux Klan, claiming 
that only those who belonged to the secret society formed by General 
Nathan Bedford Forrest were true Klansmen. With this narrow definition 
historian Allen W. Trelease disagreed. 1 
In his book, White· Terror~- ·The Ku-Klux Klan· conspiracy and 
Southern Reconstruction, Trelease--a noted authority on the history of 
the Ku Klux Klan--recognized the existence of that group in post-Civil 
War Texas. More important, Trelease defined exactly what constituted 
Klan activity. Any group, regardless of name, which practiced 
terroristic measures--physical, psychological, or both--was Ku Klux 
Klan. 2 Also involved in the "conspiracy" were all whites who aided and 
abetted the secret societies. Many Anglos, who themselves were not 
members of any Klavern, nevertheless supported Klan activities, both 
privately and publicly. Others, usually out of fear, refused to take 
1 
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any legal action against Klan violence and intimidation. On this basis 
Trelease stated that "at least twenty (Texas) counties were involved in 
Ku Klux terror." 3 Trelease argued also that Klan activity terminated in 
Texas by 1868. However, more recent and in-depth research reveals that 
Trelease, although he properly defined the nature of the problem, failed 
to recognize the magnitude and the duration of Ku Klux Klan activity in 
Texas. 
Not only did Trelease underestimate the geographical dimensions of 
the terror, but he also failed fully to measure its longevity. In 1866 
seven counties in eastern and central Texas experienced Klan violence. 
By 1867 that figure had quadrupled to twenty-seven counties, an increase 
of 292 percent. The zenith of Ku Klux Klan terror in 1868 brought a 
further broadening of activity, the number of affected counties growing 
by 444 percent to thirty-nine. By December of 1868, 39.7 percent, a 
full fifty-four of the one hundred and thirty-six counties of eastern 
and central Texas, suffered disruptions characterized by Klan 
methodology and tactics. To establish their control of an area, often 
Klansmen infiltrated the political and economic spheres of Texas society 
through the use of violence and intimidation. These were the most 
common ways of achieving and maintaining power. But not every Klansman 
sought power. In some cases Klansmen simply became violent for the sake 
of violence itself. The reign of Klan terror continued throughout the 
course of Reconstruction and for at least four years thereafter, a 
longer post-Reconstruction duration alone than Trelease identified in 
all. Evidence proves that some Klaverns were active even past 1870, the 
year which marked the readmission of Texas into the Union and officially 
ended Reconstruction in that state. 4 
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A phenomenon such as the extreme unrest which Texas endured for 
nearly a decade after the close of hostilities could not possibly spring 
full blown from even the bitterness and frustrations of a narrow defeat. 
Rather, causes lay in the structure of society in the Lone Star State 
prior to the Civil War. To understand adequately the origin of Ku Klux 
Klan activity in Texas, it is first necessary to describe attitudes and 
conditions in Texas during and after the war, conditions which led to an 
increase in racial tensions within the state. 
In 1860 only 5 percent of the population lived in small towns or 
cities. The main urban centers in this period were Austin, Galveston, 
Houston, and San Antonio. Capital investment reached only $3.2 million. 
Nine hundred and eighty-three businesses employed 3,449 people. Even in 
urban centers agriculture dominated. Most of the jobs created dealt 
with the handling and processing of raw materials. 
Cotton ruled Texas. In the boom years of the 1850s, cotton 
production increased by more than 600 percent, from 58,161 bales in 1850 
to 431,463 bales in 1859. Exports from Galveston in 1865 totaled 
$9,691,751, of which $9,669,515 came from the shipment of cotton. 
Despite the profits, there were two disadvantages to having cotton as 
the main cash crop. First was the depletion of the soil's mineral 
content by the fluffy fiber. Farmers in Texas had not yet learned the 
secret of rotating crops to replenish the elements taken from the earth 
by each particular commodity. Growers used the same land for the same 
crop repeatedly until productivity became virtually nil. When the 
fields reached that stage, planters merely acquired new land, and the 
cycle began again. Acres of once fertile soil in eastern Texas were 
left barren and deserted. That was the common pattern throughout the 
South as vast amounts of land became desolate. 5 
The second drawback to cotton culture was the large workforce it 
required. Anglo-American settlers first introduced slavery into the 
region long before the Union granted Texas statehood. Non- or 
anti-slaveholding immigrants from Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois 
settled the northern counties. The population in the frontier region 
consisted of only a small percentage of slaves in relation to the large 
white population. The German counties north of San Antonio were 
abolitionist. The largest concentration of slaves per capita was in 
southeast Texas along the Brazos, Colorado, Sabine, and Trinity rivers. 
In that area the geography most resembled other slave-holding Southern 
states. Also, with the state's railroad system in this region, 
4 
producers had easier access to markets, primarily through Galveston, the 
focal point of Texas trade. 6 
The state government attempted to resolve many of the major 
concerns faced by Texans in the pre-Civil War era. Property taxes 
remained low for the most part. There was no bureaucracy which assessed 
the land. Rather, assessment depended on the discretion of the 
landowners. This gave them the opportunity to under-assess or forget to 
assess the land as they chose. 
The state legislature also provided a sure labor supply by passing 
bills which insured an adequate workforce, slave labor. Officials 
created additional statutes which established a police force to control 
the slaves. This action further safeguarded the interests of the 
landowners. 
With land and labor under control, the key issues became 
transportation and credit. Transportation, or the lack of it, proved 
5 
detrimental to the agricultural sector during the antebellum period. 
The high costs of shipping severely cut into the margin of profit that 
existed. A large amount of liquid capital was needed to sustain the 
farmer between harvests. As the supply of reserve cash diminished, 
credit purchases increased, compounding the problem more. Merchants 
charged an exorbitant annual interest rate of 10 to 12.5 percent for 
most items bought on credit. In an attempt to solve the problems, state 
legislators channeled federal funds earmarked for one purpose into 
budgets intended to handle more immediate issues. For example, in the 
1850s Texas received $2 million from the federal government for the 
development of a public school program. State officials used the money 
instead as a means to initiate a new railway system. 
Prior to the war Texas existed as a largely underdeveloped 
backwater, the western edge of the Southern frontier. Economically and 
socially primitive, the state had little to lose in gambling on the 
success of secession, and great benefit--glory at the least--could come 
to those who dared. 
With the advent of the Civil War, Texas joined the Confederate 
states on March 1, 1861. Because of the conscription law of April 26, 
1862, and loyalty to the Southern cause, 50,000 to 65,000 Texans fought 
for the Confederacy during the course of the four-year war. By refusing 
to enlist on behalf of the South, Union sympathizers in Texas found 
their lives threatened. Nevertheless, despite growing internal racial 
tensions, Texas prospered during the war years. 8 
Unlike the other Southern states, which witnessed the disadvantages 
of daily battle, in Texas the war for the most part was remote. Enemy 
armies did not invade Texas, burn cities, force slaves off of 
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plantations, or destroy crops and farmland. In fact, the opposite was 
true. Harvests were plentiful, and slaves were abundant.· Many 
slaveholders in the major zones of combat sent their slaves to Texas for 
safekeeping. lifestyles in the lone Star State remained for the most 
part unhampered by the war. In a sense Texas emerged from the Southern 
defeat as a victor. Texas never experienced a shortage of food or a 
lack of hard capital. However, the surrender of Robert E. lee to 
Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia, and the consequent 
collapse of the Confederacy brought about a severe change in the status 
quo. The primary concern centered around the question of the newly 
freed Afro-Americans. What degree of freedom--human, civil, and 
political rights--was the black to have, and how could white society 
guarantee the continuation of black labor?9 
Most white Texans regarded the emancipation of the Afro-American 
with disfavor. Whites openly opposed granting the freedmen full and 
immediate civil rights. They wanted instead .. gradual emancipation and 
compulsory labor... White Southerners were willing to accept the newly 
freed blacks only as a subservient group whose sole purpose was to 
provide menial for labor white society, as had been the custom prior to 
the war. 10 Only on the arrival of federal troops in the summer and fall 
of 1865 did Southern conservatives agree to consider such an undesirable 
measure as equality for freedmen. 
Acting as emissary for President Andrew Johnson, General Gordon 
Granger, in a communique from his district headquarters at Galveston, 
Texas, on June 19, 1865, in General Orders Number Three proclaimed 
freedom for all former slaves. He also stated that 11 an absolute 
equality of personal rights, and the right of property between former 
masters and slaves, and the connection heretofore existing between them 
becomes that between employer and hired labor ... General Granger 
cautioned blacks to remain docile and at their current place of 
residence. There was to be no travel to military installations. 
Furthermore, idleness on the part of freedmen would not be tolerated. 11 
The announcement by the federal military representative to Texas 
that .. all blacks are free .. had little effect on Texas society. Former 
slaves who, for whatever reason, attempted to leave their previous 
masters were returned to their former owners for .. employment ... 
Afro-Americans with no owners were put to work doing manual labor under 
the supervision of military personnel. This placed freedmen in the 
position of being intimidated not only by white Texans but also by some 
federal authorities sent to Texas to 11 help the blacks ... 12 
General Granger's statement that 11 idleness on the part of the 
colored population would not be tolerated, .. gave white Texans their 
justification for further intimidation of blacks. In a conversation 
between the mayor of Galveston and Colonel R.G. Laughlin, 
Provost-Marshall General, the New-York Times quoted the Galvestonian as 
declaring, 11 the negro question will turn out much better than most 
people in Texas anticipate ... 13 
Idleness on the part of whites appeared to go unnoticed as well as 
unmentioned by local, state, and federal authorities in Texas. Neutral 
sources outside the state warned Texans and federal officials of the 
dangers of establishing a double standard. As one of them said, only 
trouble would come from making 
distinctions based upon color alone, g1v1ng white men the 
right to be idle as they please, but not tolerate idleness 
among the blacks; allowing whites to work where they please, 
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but sendi~g blacks •home to their masters• or to the public 
works ... 
Despite emancipation, the freedman was not truly free in Texas. It was 
only a matter of time before whites initiated black labor contracts. 
On July 3, 1865, the Galveston·Balletin printed an example of a 
black labor contract intended for use statewide. By signing the 
contract the freedman agreed that not only he but his wife and minor 
children would work for a fixed monthly rate. The employer was to 
provide clothing, house-rent, food, medicine, and medical treatment. 
The employer had the right to deduct a fixed fee at·a per-day rate for 
any time lost on the job by the employee or any family member for any 
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reason other than illness. Further deductions were authorized for any 
family member unable to work. 15 It was not uncommon for the employer to 
decide that the amount of deductions exceeded the amount due to the 
freedman and his family. The term "slavery" now gave way to the term 
"contract labor." 
The same situations confronted blacks in 1865 as had existed before 
so-called emancipation. The environment of slavery had particular 
strength in the area between the Neches River and the Sabine River and 
extended as far north as Henderson County, Texas. 16 Some Texans hoped 
that the establishment of a provisional government and the Freedman•s 
Bureau in Texas would help to resolve the black man•s dilemma. Those 
people received only further disappointment, and intimidation entered a 
new realm of terror. 
July 21, 1865, marked the arrival of Andrew Jackson Hamilton at 
Galveston. Hamilton was to serve as provisional governor of Texas, an 
appointment which he received personally from President Johnson on June 
17, 1865. Basing his opinion on the Constitution of the United States, 
Johnson strongly believed that the federal government had the 
responsibility to insure to each state a republican form of government. 
Hamilton had direct instructions to register voters in order to elect 
delegates to a state constitutional convention. The purpose of the 
convention was to restore civil government to the people of Texas. 
Having reestablished that civil government, Texas could return to the 
Union. 
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Election of delegates had three restrictions. Only those 
individuals who had opposed the secession of Texas from the Union prior 
to the Civil War could be elected to represent their respective 
districts. Furthermore, unless the individual in question took the oath 
of amnesty set forth in the presidential proclamation of May 29, 1865, 
the delegate-elect was ineligible. The third stipulation required the 
representative to have been a qualified voter as set forth by state law 
before secession. 
It was this last clause which was of utmost significance. Under 
antebellum voter qualification laws established in 1837, any non-slave 
of one-eighth Negro blood or more was excluded from voting. This 
arrangement meant that the state constitutional convention would have an 
all white composition. Although there were some defenders of civil 
rights for the newly freed blacks, the white majority was still against 
total emancipation. 
In December of 1865, an organization, most commonly referred to as 
the Freedmen's Bureau, ''officially" came to Texas. Under the 
jurisdiction of the War Department, the bureau came into being when an 
act by the 38th Congress on March 3, 1865, formed the Bureau of 
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Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands. 17 The primary objective of the 
bureau was to safeguard the interests of the newly emancipated blacks. 
Freedom for the former slaves created many socio-economic problems that 
most white Southern Democrats were neither able nor willing to solve. 
White hostility led to the demise of the bureau long before the agency 
had a chance ever to succeed. It became the embodiment of all factors 
that Southerners resented most--primarily Yankee domination and the 
guardianship of civil rights for freed peoples by Radical Republican 
rule. 18 
Serving the Lone Star State as assistant commissioner for the 
federal agency was General E. M. Gregory, previously of Philadelphia. 
Gregory found no atmosphere of peaceful co-existence between blacks and 
whites when he arrived in Texas. Freedman had, under coercion, to sign 
and to work under unsatisfactory labor contracts, and they, not 
surprisingly, broke those contracts. Many blacks had been tricked into 
working without labor agreements. Whites had told the Afro-Americans 
that they would inherit the property on the death of their former 
master, now "employer." In the first fiscal quarter of 1866 only a 
small percentage of the approximately 8,000 blacks in Galveston County 
19 had signed legal contracts· between management and labor. 
Knowing the significance of having the terms of employment in 
writing, Gregory stressed that all labor contracts must be not only 
signed but also registered with the Freedmen's Bureau. Furthermore, any 
labor agreement was to. be upheld by all parties involved. Premature 
termination of the contract could not occur without sufficient cause. 
Offenders would suffer punishment for non-compliance. 20 
Gregory believed that his long term objective of a strong labor 
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system could not be achieved without six basic elements as its 
foundation. Those elements included: a shared goal or mutual interest 
between management and labor; a just settlement of all previous 
liabilities; contracts created on fair and liberal terms with prompt 
signatures on the part of labor; humane treatment; fair and liberal 
compensation; .. an honest day•s pay for an honest day•s work .. ; and the 
extension of educational facilities to blacks. 21 
Wages of black laborers varied depending on the region. Wages of 
$15.00 (in specie) per month plus board occurred in areas where the 
labor pool from which to select workmen was plentiful. In the 
bottomland of the Brazos, Little Brazos, San Antonio, San Marcos, 
Colorado, and Trinity rivers, laborers worked for shares. Agency 
officials estimated some freedpeople received half of the crop after the 
employer subtracted expenses. In areas where workers were scarce, some 
planters paid the usual salary plus a bonus of $20.00 a person per 
season for .. good colored men ... 22 
Despite some improvements in the area of labor, lawlessness and 
murder increased in Texas in the first half of 1866. An influx of 
population from the major northern cities of New York City, Chicago, St. 
Louis, and Cincinnati further added to the disorder and unrest because 
many Texans viewed the newcomers as opportunists seeking to impose alien 
ideas while at the same~ime despoiling the 11 War ravaged state." In 
Galveston alone the post-war census showed an increase of 5,000 people 
over the pre-war figure. Local white Southerners started forming 
vigilance committees. Officials warned citizens not to leave their 
houses after dusk. Federal officials also became the target of 
violence. Southern white Democrats began to feel more threatened as 
12 
federal agents and Radical Republicans tried to infiltrate all areas of 
local and state authority. The greatest area of resentment concerned 
continued interference in the way local whites dealt with their black 
counterparts. White Texans retaliated by means of the state 
constitutional convention. 23 
White delegates to the state's constitutional convention of 
1866--prescribed by Presidential Reconstruction--wasted no time in 
determining the status of black Texans. Whites allowed a freeman only 
to testify in court cases involving another black. Whites who had not 
objected prior to the Civil War to sharing accommodations with blacks 
found segregated railway cars a necessity. Texas legislators passed 
that measure mainly in retaliation against what they considered Northern 
interference. 
With the election of the first state legislature, whites expanded 
the Texas black codes to include such additional prohibitions as 
intermarriage, voting, office holding, and jury service. Legislators 
passed a law requiring all jurors to be householders in the county or 
property owners in the state. The absence of legal protection for 
blacks gave whites the liberty to exercise their racist tendencies. 24 
As a consequence, crimes, both racial and political in origin, 
increased proportionately as the desire to maintain white supremacy 
became stronger. In the three years following the war, lawlessness in 
Texas became increasingly widespread. Writing about "unbridled crime" 
in Texas, historian E. Merton Coulter contended that the so-called 
"racial and political violence'' was propaganda put forth by Radical 
Republican politicians and Union army officers. It was white Texans, 
not the freedmen, who suffered. 25 Statistics proved his conclusion to 
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be false. In the 977 slayings which occurred from 1865 to 1868, whites 
killed 421 of the 468 blacks reported murdered. Freedmen were 
responsible for only 5 of the 509 white fatalities. Remarked General 
Philip Sheridan, 11 Indians killing white men on the frontier caused much 
greater consternation than white men killing Negroes in the interior {of 
Texas) ... 26 In this atmosphere the Ku Klux Klan was able to develop and 
prosper. 
Formed at Pulaski, Tennessee, in May or June of 1866, the Klan was, 
as founder Nathan Bedford Forrest designed it, a social club for 
ex-Confederates. There was no thought of expanding the society. Due to 
the popularity of Greek in the liberal arts schools curriculum at that 
time, Forrest and his colleagues decided on the term Ku Klux from the 
27 Greek word kaklos meaning circle or band. Thus, Ku Klux Klan was the 
name given to this new organization. The secret ceremonies of the Ku 
Klux Klan attracted many, much as ritual and secrecy attracted people to 
labor and social organizations of the period. Moreover, Klansmen were 
to uphold the lost cause of the South. 
By June of 1867, the Ku Klux Klan had spread throughout the 
Southern states. With that expansion and the coincident growth of 
vigilantism, the Klan took on a new meaning. It became a terroristic 
organization to protect Southern white society from the 11 black menace ... 
Whites feared a race war similar to the one which had occurred in Santo 
Domingo in the 1790s. To prevent that from happening, the Klan became 
one of the chief instruments to keep freedmen submissive. Groups like 
the Knights of the White Camellia, who belonged to the Invisible Empire 
of the Ku Klux Klan, existed from the Potomac to the Rio Grande by April 
of 1868. 28 
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Through terror, intimidation, and violence, Klansmen demoralized 
Negroes and Radical Republicans. No one was exempt from Klan terror. 
Although specific reasons for terrorism varied, the general motives were 
political, social, and economic in nature. Politically, the Klan used 
every means available to stop radical rule. Klansmen canceled meetings, 
threatened the lives of Republicans, and kept freedmen and whites from 
voting any way but Democratic. The latter became a holy crusade which 
was Machiavellian in style--the end justified the means. Klansmen 
willingly used arson and murder to achieve their goals. By the time of 
the presidential election of 1868, the Ku Klux Klan had succeeded in 
undermining black support for Northern radicals. 29 
Whites used the Ku Klux Klan as a constant reminder to blacks of 
Afro-American social inferiority. Whipped, beaten, shot, raped, 
mutilated, and hanged, blacks were the target of Klan violence. The Ku 
Klux Klan used all of these methods to keep the black subservient. 
Klansmen visited freedmen for reasons ranging from walking on the wrong 
side of the sidewalk to talking back to a white. Furtherm·ore, the Ku 
Klux Klan destroyed schools and churches which practiced 
desegregation. 30 
Economically, white farmers and planters used the Ku Klux Klan to 
patrol counties and localities to keep blacks docile and working. After 
having gained the benefits of cheap labor for the harvest, Klansmen 
drove the black sharecroppers off the land which the blacks had made 
fruitful. Whites then claimed that the blacks had abandoned the land. 
Thus, the white landlord had the right to claim the abandoned land and 
31 
crops. 
Throughout the course of Reconstruction, the Knights of the Rising 
Sun, the Knights of the Golden Circle, the Knights of the White 
Camellia, and the White Caps and other groups under different names 
terrorized Texas. From the Gulf of Mexico to the Red River, those 
organizations flourished. The Ku Klux Klan appeared first in 1866 in 
the widely separated Texas counties of Anderson, Collin, Hays, Panola, 
Robertson, Tarrant, and Travis. Such geographical separation was 
15 
insignificant because in all areas the Texas Klan had the same social, 
political, and economic motives as did Klan affiliates in other Southern 
states. 
Racial tensions were high in Anderson County. On April 2, 1866, a 
mob of whites disrupted and dispersed a black congregation and warned 
the preacher never to preach again. An inhabitant of Anderson County 
called Reconstruction "a life and death struggle for Southern white 
people to exist." The term "renegade" became synonymous with Unionist. 
Fluctuation of black population throughout the county caused concern. 
Whites feared miscegenation. Out of fear of freedmen and radicals, the 
Anglos of Anderson County created their own chapter of the Ku Klux 
Klan. 32 
Counties other than Anderson experienced Klan growth. R. D. 
Allison founded the Ku Klux Klan in Collin County. Allison secured a 
charter from Klan headquarters in Tennessee. The Collin County Klan, 
formed near McKinney, with 100 to 200 members, operated under this 
document. The group usually settled for holding mere business meetings, 
but "there were few occassions (sic) for overt acts." 33 Perhaps the 
members were more cautious than was common elsewhere. 
In Hays county the Ku Klux Klan attacked black schools. At a log 
\ 
schoolhouse near Williamson Creek, Klansmen threatened the teacher, a 
16 
white man referred to only as Tilden, and ordered him to stay away from 
the blacks. Tilden quit at the close of the school year. Despite Klan 
pressure, Hamlet Campbell--a Northern black educator--moved to the area, 
rented a room, and held school for blacks free of charge. 34 
While threats normally sufficed in Hays and Anderson counties, more 
serious techniques prevailed elsewhere. Night-riding Klansmen were 
notorious in Robertson County, especially near Calvert, Texas. In the 
middle of the night, the hooded men awakened unsuspecting blacks and 
whipped them. A more favored tactic was to hang blacks by their thumbs. 
Some blacks received such severe beatings that they were unable to work. 
Because of emotional stress, others were incapable of work. Fearing for 
their lives, freemen refused to sleep in their homes. Instead they 
sought safety and shelter in the dark woods near their houses. 35 
Robertson County had no monopoly on intimidation. In Tarrant and 
Travis counties Klansmen also intimidated freedmen. Assaulting blacks 
at will, the Ku Klux Klan in the latter county was supposedly bad. 
Whites used the Klan to control blacks in the Fort Worth (Tarrant 
County) vicinity; its function was to keep the Negro docile and working. 
Klansmen paid special attention ·to those blacks who "got into 
devilment," which meant anything from being discourteous to whites or 
refusing to perform forced labor. Consequently, freedmen in Tarrant 
County, as did blacks throughout the South, remained extremely fearful 
of the hooded men on horseback. 36 
A greater increase in Klan and Klan-like violence, murder, and 
aggravated assault occurred in 1867. Records indicated that 411 murders 
occurred from March to December of 1867. There were seventy-eight 
additional cases in the month which followed. Fifteen new counties 
reported Ku Klux Klan activities, bringing the total to twenty-two by 
January of 1868. 37 
Texas conservatives, conducting their battle for white supremacy, 
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committed outrages continually toward the freemen. Blacks had no chance 
of justice, for local authorities refused to bring indictments against 
whites for terrorizing or killing blacks. This lack of local 
cooperation made the situation more difficult for federal troops 
stationed in Texas who tried to protect freedmen. They found their 
efforts hampered by local and state authorities who did not keep their 
racist attitudes a secret. 38 
Harsher black labor codes further violated the civil rights of the 
freedmen in 1867. Employers cheated freedmen out of wages. Those 
blacks who insisted on payment ran the risk of a nightly visit from the 
Ku Klux Klan. Not being paid properly for their labor reduced the 
blacks to a state of semi-slavery. Many freedmen appealed to federal 
officials for protection of life and property. Other blacks attempted 
to leave Texas. Whites murdered blacks who tried to escape or break 
their labor contracts. The bodies of miscreants were publicly displayed 
as a warning to other freedmen. Racial tension continued to 
intensify. 39 
By the end of 1867, then, Texas had established all of the 
preconditions for a Ku Klux Klan reign of terror. The states had 
floundered as a frontier society. The states primitive transportation 
system concentrated primarily in the cotton producing region--the area 
where secessionist sentiment ran most vehemently--not in the older, more 
conservative areas of European and Mexican settlement. Individuals, 
with Southern ancestry and sympathies predominant, comprised the 
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government, even in areas with strong minority communities, producing 
friction rather than cooperation, especially in the tension-filled years 
prior to the outbreak of war. 
The state had repudiated equality, the Union cause, and everything 
Northern well before the occupation. And a "disloyal" minority had 
fostered the frustrations festering in the hearts of virulently 
patriotic Southerners, those who had seen the noble cause fall although 
the fight could, in their eyes, have continued indefinitely. 
Texans came unpunished from the war. And they owed penance to no 
one. When a glorious hero of the late conflict proposed a social club, 
they flocked to its colors, just as they had to the stars and bars. And 
when, in the Texan view, the victors became vindictive, the betrayed 
losers responded as tradition dictated. They fought again--this time in 
armor less rigid, but in no lesser a cause. They donned the regalia of 
mystery and rode off into the night in search of the preservation of 
their civilization from alien concepts of equality for inferior breeds 
and from lesser men whom they had whipped on the fields of battle but 
who had stolen the victory through numbers not valor. That those 
degraded products of the Northern machine society could seek to impose 
impossible rules on the Texas agrarians proved too much to bear. 
Defiance, frustration, and a still intact sense of superiority, an 
attitude both Southern and Western and more than the sum of the two, led 
Texans naturally into an organization which promised to restore all that 
had been taken, not lost but taken, by deceit and deception despite 
great and noble sacrifices for the cause. The innocuous Klan admittedly 
terrorized, but most of the terror would have been but prankish had not 
the weaklings in both the Reconstruction government and the shanties of 
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former slaves been so timid. Admittedly, excessive enthusiasm 
occasionally produced violence. But for the most part, in the logic of 
the twisted crusade, the Klan showed restraint. 
This is not to apologize for the organization. Its guilt is 
palpable. However, it is essential to establish that the Klan and its 
imitators, in the early years of Reconstruction in Texas, lacked the 
virulent character--the propensity toward gratuitous brutality, heinous 
deviation from all civilized behavior--that came to characterize the 
loose congeries of organizations which ran amok, settling old scores, 
cleansing festering wounds from an earlier time, in the peak years. No 
matter that the Klan in 1866 and 1867 was irresponsible, evil, and 
outside the law, those were virtues in comparison to the behavior which 
ineffective or apathetic government, a sympathetic citizenry, and a 
badly overextended military allowed or abetted in 1868. 
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CHAPTER II 
ZENITH 
The year 1868 brought a new wave of terror to all sections of Texas 
as Ku Klux Klan violence reached its zenith. Sincere lawmakers 
attempted to reestablish civilization in the state. Their principal 
goal was to bring the Lone Star State back into the Union. However, 
despite the efforts of Unionist legislators to curtail strife, the 
internal situation in Texas became increasingly volatile. Strongly 
diverse and overeaching political, economic and social factors made it 
impossible for the Texas legislature, alone, to solve the magnitude of 
problems within the state--at least through the normal legislative 
channels. By the close of the year, Klan and Klan-like raids, 
intimidations, and murders had quadrupled. However, such acts of 
lawlessness were not new. Neither was racial violence. Rather, their 
roots lay in the years even prior to Reconstruction. 
As early as 1862, non-black minority groups in Texas found 
themselves the focal point of strong violent acts. Criminal outrages at 
that time were mainly political, social, and economic in origin. Whites 
directed their anger toward three principal groups--the Germans, the 
Mexicans, and the Norwegians. 1 
Approximately 54,000 Germans had established their communities in 
the counties of Bexar, Bandera, Comal, Fayette, Kendall, Kerr, and 
Gillespie. All of these counties lay between the major cities of San 
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Antonio and Austin. And these counties were strongly Unionist. In the 
vote on the issue of whether or not Texas should join the Confederacy, 
these counties had voted against secession. Once Texas had formally 
withdrawn from the Union in 1861, German anti-secessionists formed a 
secret society in support of the cause which the majority of Texans had 
repudiated. The secret Union society of Germans served throughout its 
existence primarily as a forum for the expression of grievances. With 
the exception of an occasional letter to the governor requesting that he 
reconsider the question of secession, the society proved harmless. 
Nevertheless, "rebels" of the area did not not look favorably on the 
organization. Pro-secessionists perceived the Germans as traitors. In 
retaliation for the treasonable activity of the Germans, the 
secessionist patriots formed their own secret societies with the purpose 
of infiltrating those of the enemy and spying on the Germans. 
Initially, activity remained on a harmless level. However, harmless 
observation gave way quickly to violence, and in the Autumn of 1861 
sixty Germans in the Texas wheat district met with violent deaths at the 
hands of rabid secessionists. 2 
Although 1861 ended on that disturbing note, the situation 
deteriorated from even such a low level. In 1862 violence toward 
German-Americans in Texas reached its peak. During that year alone 
secessionists and Confederate rebels were responsible for the deaths of 
approximately 400 Germans in the abovementioned counties. In Comal, 
Kerr, and Gillespie counties loyal Germans held a series of open 
meetings early in 1862. Rebel authorities increased their measures to 
suppress the anti-secessionists. Violence erupted in May of 1862 after 
the Germans failed in two separate attempts to take over Fort Mason at 
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San Antonio. With the second failure, Confederate military officials 
appointed a Captain Duff, a Scot, to terminate all "d d Dutch 
conspiracies." 3 Leading 300 cavalrymen, Duff set out to do just that. 
Arriving in San Antonio, Duff publicly declared the German counties 
to be under martial law. All men of enlistment age were to enroll for 
military duty and to take the Confederate oath. Failure to do so would 
result in "the pain of arrest and imprisonment." Secretly Duff and his 
lieutenant ordered that no prisoner be taken alive. 4 
On August 10, 1862, a group of sixty-two young Germans attempted to 
flee Texas. Their goal was to escape into Mexico through Eagle Pass on 
the Rio Grande River in Maverick County, Texas, just as A. J. Hamilton 
and his followers had done before them. This time, the loyalists did 
not succeed. Surrounded by 120 soldiers near Fort Clark on the Nueces 
River, the small band of refugees fell in defeat oefore the superior 
rebel force. After eight hours of battle only fifteen managed to 
escape. However, that any of the Germans eluded his forces enraged 
Duff. Infuriated, Duff and his men terrorized the German counties of 
Bexar, Comal, Gillespie, Kendall, and Kerr. Throughout the remainder of 
1862, Duff raided--mainly at night--burning, beating, hanging, drowning, 
murdering, and raping. Area secessionists joined Duff in his rampages. 
Neither Germans nor their associates were safe. 
In contrast, 1863 proved to be a relatively quiet year. From 
February to May 1864, however, sporadic killings resumed. But in 
neither year did murders attain the level that had characterized 1862. 5 
Another ethnic group non-exempt from racial violence and 
intimidation was the Mexican people in Texas--the Tejans. The largest 
concentration of Mexicans settled in the sixteen counties in the 
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furthermost southern tip of Texas. Still, Mexican populations could be 
found from border to border, from the cities of Indianola in Victoria 
County and San Antonio in Bexar County, both in central Texas, to 
Brownsville in Cameron County and El Paso in El Paso County, in south 
and southwestern Texas respectively. 6 
Viewed by their white neighbors as racial and social inferiors, the 
Tejano underwent at the hands of Anglos much the same difficulties as 
blacks and Germans were enduring. Tactics remained the same--nightly 
visits by lynch mobs and vigilantes. Historian Arnaldo De Leon claimed 
that the murdering of the Tejano during the Civil War and Reconstruction 
was so common as to be considered no crime. 11 Mexicans became 
unsuspecting victims., of the violent climate which raged in Texas from 
1861 through 1877. Unfortunately, no accurate figures are available for 
the total atrocities committed against Mexican-Americans during this 
period, but a conservative judgment is that hundreds of Mexicans were 
murdered by lawless whites in the years of terror. White attitudes of 
racial superiority, when combined with the slogan, .,Remember the Alamo, 
Remember Goliad, .. provided bases enough for the sanctioning of outrages 
and atrocities. 7 
NDt only was loss of life high in the Tejano community, but loss of 
property reach unmeasured proportions. In the first two years of the 
war alone, Anglos illegally confiscated millions of dollars worth of 
property from an estimated 20,000 Mexican-Americans in South Texas. 8 
Local pro-secessionists also targeted Norwegian minorities for 
violence. These Europeans in Bosque, Henderson, Kaufman, and Van Zandt 
counties were the subjects of routine intimidations by area whites. 
Violence never reached the heights it did against the Germans, blacks, 
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and Mexicans. The reason for comparative civility toward the Norwegian 
community was probably that the whites in these counties of northern 
Texas outnumbered the European minority by huge ratios. 9 
If the outrages against minorities were not enough to occupy the 
time of area Anglos, atrocities toward whites by whites ranked high in 
the first two years of the war. Hundreds of loyalists met the same fate 
as had their minority contemporaries. 
One account told of pro-secessionists in Cooke County, in the 
spring of 1862, murdering approximately fifty men. Confederate 
sympathizers hanged the loyalists in less than sixty minutes, all from 
the same tree. In June of 1862, rebel soldiers terrorized north Texas, 
killing 200 Union supporters. During the autumn of 1862, another fifty 
men of Cooke County died in the course of one evening for failing to 
denounce the Union and take the Confederate oath. Further terror spread 
through Cooke County during the remainder of 1862. A rebel officer, 
Colonel Bowland, died at the hands of a man believed to be a loyalist. 
Out to revenge his father's death, Bowland's son organized a gang. The 
younger Bowland and his crew rode throughout Cooke County, killing at 
random. At least eighteen people died before the rampage ended. 10 
Violence of this sort was not limited to Cooke County. In Hunt 
County unnamed assailants murdered a Mr. Wilson. They then stripped the 
body, cut it into pieces, and threw the pieces to the hogs. 11 
With the nature of violence during the first few years of the Civil 
War, it is not hard to understand how the Ku Klux Klan, once established 
in Texas, was able to reach the strength and magnitude it did in 1868. 
The area of Klan activity broadened significantly, well beyond the 
concept of the traditional elements which had produced the Klan 
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elsewhere throughout the South. Therefore it is probable that the 
factors which encouraged the growth of the Ku Klux Klan in the first two 
years after the war no longer applied completely. Although those 
elements did not disappear, their impact diminished. The Klan of 1868 
was different from that of the preceding years. The change came because 
of three factors: 1) lack of a significant policing agency; 2) general 
lawlessness and the willingness of many to take the law into their own 
hands, i.e., frontier justice; and 3) the presence of traditional 
elements. This last factor was perhaps the most significant for in it 
resided the fundamental basis for conflict. Examples are Unionist 
against rebel, pro-secessionist against anti-secessionist, white against 
immigrants, and white against black. This is not to say that the 
Southern style Klan disappeared from Texas in 1868. It is, however, 
reasonable merely to suggest that the Ku Klux Klan offered a cover for 
lawlessness in that year, outlawry which may well have prevailed even 
had the Klan never come to the state. The targets for violence 
reappeared with the newly-emancipated Afro-Americans. But outrages 
against other groups, victims of long-standing, did not stop with the 
increased attacks on blacks. 
The increase in crime grew proportionately with the decreased 
efforts of federal officials to deal effectively with the violence. 
This pattern was due partly to the overall size of Texas and in part to 
the manner in which the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned 
Lands had been organized. 
In 1868 a large portion of Texas remained frontier. Available 
troops stationed in the region were overextended in their assignments. 
It was their duty to defend a perimeter greater than 1300 miles. Had 
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state civil authorities, i.e., the governor, been more willing to use 
the black militia at their disposal, law enforcement might have 
succeeded in some areas. However, given the views of most Texans 
concerning the freedmen, a black in any position of authority would have 
proved d]sastrous. Governors throughout the South, not only in Texas, 
lived in too much daily fear of inciting a full scale race war to even 
consider the poss,ibility of using the black militia. 12 
The impracticality of using that significant police force made law 
enforcement on behalf of the military almost impossible. The war 
department assigned 4,544 officers and enlisted men to Texas. Only 30 
percent of that force resided in the interior. Of the 1,318 troops in 
the Texas interior, the military stationed 534 troops at Marshall, 
I 
Texas, alone; 215 troops at Richardson, Texas; 208 troops at Austin, 
Texas; and 100 men at Galveston, Texas. The war department had left 
only 261 men to oversee affairs at the remaining eight posts in the 
. t . 13 1n er1 or. 
Galveston served as the center of the Freedmen•s Bureau in Texas. 
The agency stationed its military personnel 11 in the most accessible and 
populous parts of the State ... Ready communication from the interior to 
headquarters was non-existent. 14 
The protocol for arrests was as follows: local sheriffs and 
marshals could ask for a small military escort to accompany them while 
making arrests. If area officials could not make the arrest or declined 
to do so, the army had the authority to proceed on its own accord. 
Another avenue for arrests lay in the federal court system. The federal 
marshal in Texas, having received a warrant from the federal court, 
could request an escort be assigned by the closest post commander. The 
detail would then set out for the alleged offender. That party would 
then be tried in federal court. Fifty percent of the cases in federal 
court resulted in convictions. 15 
For the most part local authorities declined to issue warrants or 
prosecute. Of the 5,000 homicide indictments filed by August of 1868, 
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once conviction in the district courts resulted. As a contrast, in 1865 
alone civil authorities in Houston punished one freedman to the full 
extent of the law--hanged by the neck until dead. Many area justices of 
the peace refused to hear a case involving a crime or a violent act 
committed against a freedman. The reasoning seemed to be that the 
crime, whatever its nature, was not an illegal offense because the 
so-called victim was a "d d nigger." 16 Furthermore, if there were 
no white witnesses to the alleged criminal act, local authorities would 
not prosecute. Those officials considered the testimony off only black 
witnesses to be insufficient grounds of bring charges. Additionally, 
outrages against Union men or other minorities besides blacks were not 
considered crimes. 17 
The duty of the military as arbitrator in curtailing hostilities 
and decreasing crime was not an easy assignment. Soldiers and bureau 
agents were often the targets of criminal acts. Political 
assassinations were common in Texas. And whites used freedmen as bait 
to trap military personnel. In Hopkins County near the town of Sulphur 
Springs, Texas, a violent group of men known as the Bickerstaff Gang 
terrorized the area. They succeeded in an ambush of army troops. They 
achieved this victory by capturing a black man, beating him, and then 
letting him escape to the closest military installation. When the 
soldiers went in search of the Bickerstaff Gang, they rode into a 
trap. 18 
Confidence of local citizens toward the military troops was 
undermined. In the settlement of Montgomery, Texas, in Montgomery 
County, for instance, bands disguised as Union soldiers terrorized the 
town. 19 
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Bureau agents assigned to areas remote from the forts often had to 
stay in civilian owned and operated boarding houses. This condition 
created further problems. lieutenant Gregory Barrett, Jr.'s assignment 
in June of 1868 was to serve as bureau agent at Tyler, Texas, located in 
Smith County. Barrett found himself with no place in which to reside. 
On moving into a boarding house, Barrett noted that all of the previous 
tenants left. The proprietor threatened to close the rooming house. 
Evicted, the agent could not find anyone else willing to rent him 
sleeping facilities. Therefore, his only alternative was to purchase a 
house, and Barrett's army pay did not cover the costs of a home plus 
furnishings. 
Townspeople were hostile to the representative of the Freedmen's 
Bureau. Daily, Barrett received insults and murder threats. local law 
enforcement officials refused to provide aid of any kind. In a report 
to his superior, Barrett stated that he was helpless to act without 
troops to support his actions. He could not achieve the Freedmen's 
Bureau's goal of a stable Reconstruction by himself. Barrett requested 
that army headquarters telegraph as follows: "Allright for yes" and 
"Yes for No." He hoped that townspeople would be led by that ruse to 
believe that troops were coming no matter what his commander's final 
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decision actually was. 20 
The situation in Tyler further intensified when the verdict of the 
court in a local trial resulted in. a near riot. The court acquitted a 
black man, Johnson, of a crime. Because of this action, whites became 
more bitter and hostile. Outrages increased, and violence occurred 
daily. Night raids by the Ku Klux Klan became common practice. 
Ultimately twenty troops arrived to help Barrett quiet the town. 21 
The bureau agent at Paris, Texas, in Lamar County also received 
threats. The Marshall Texan Republican quoted the editor of the Paris 
Vindicator as stating that the local bureau agent had been 
"Ku-Kluxed." 22 Nevertheless, violence against agency officials 
elsewhere did not reach the level it did in Tyler. 
By the fourth quarter of 1868, civil authority was powerless. The 
military forces in the interior were so scattered that they were 
ineffective as a policing agency. The counties of Henderson, Jefferson, 
Marshall, Rusk, Smith, and Upshur were totally out of control. Daily 
outrages against radicals and blacks were too numerous to GOUnt 
accurately. The subassistant commissioner at Jefferson requested that 
the area by.placed under martial law. 23 
Citizens and lawmakers nationwide were shocked at the reports of 
"unbridled crime" that emerged from Texas. E. Merton Coulter, in his 
analysis of the Lone Star State during the period, is partially correct 
in his views. Coulter claimed that all crime in Texas was non-political 
and not a result of the recent war. However, his failure to recognize 
the atrocities being committed toward blacks and non-black minorities as 
criminal acts was a grievous error. According to Coulter: 
It [crime in Texas] represented the growing pains of a 
frontier region inadequately policed and still encumbered by 
its Indians. Its crimes related to horse stealing, cattle 
rustling, sa12~n shootings, Mexican bandits, and Indian 
pi 11 agi ngs ... 
The above statement may well have applied to the frontier regions of 
Texas, that is to say the southern tip, southwestern, and western 
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portions of Texas. But even this application is blantantly prejudiced. 
Furthermore, no student of Texas history can claim that the 
abovementioned "crimes" were the only illegal acts committed in eastern 
and central Texas. 
It has already been established that life In Texas during and after 
the war was anything but peaceful and safe. The year 1868 was no 
exception. The Ku Klux Klan had entrenched itself strongly throughout 
the eastern and central portions of the state by the middle of that 
year. Historian James E. Sefton believed there to be "some political 
motive" connected to the general lawlessness. A large segment of the 
populace joined the Ku Klux Klan. Simultaneously, county Democratic 
organizations sponsored barbecues which Klaverns attended on a frequent 
if not a steady basis. Thus, a link occurred between the Klan and 
southern Democrats. The army, according to Sefton, did not know the 
"specific motive" for Klan growth and popularity in counties throughout 
Texas. 25 
In a letter to the Adjutant-general of the United States Army, 
Brevet Major General J.J. Reynolds summarized the situation in Texas for 
the military year ending September 30, 1868. Reynolds believe the Ku 
Klux Klan existed throughout Texas. Klaverns worked both independently 
and in collaboration with outlaw gangs. The Klan was strongest in 
northeast Texas. Trelease agreed with this statement, for Trelease 
placed the "nucleus" of Klan activity in Jefferson, Texas, located in 
Marion County. The most common activities of the Texas Klans were: 
to disarm, rob, and in many cases murder Union men and 
negroes, and as occasion may offer, murder United States 
officers and soldiers; also to intimidate everyone ~~o knows 
anything of the organization, but will not join it. 
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Reynolds blamed the Klan for most of the criminal violence in northeast 
Texas. 
There was no civil law east of the Trinity River. The majority of 
civil law enforcement agents themselves were Klan members or members of 
armed gangs. The few that were not, the Klan forced to flee for their 
lives, provided, of course, that the Klan allowed them to escape at all. 
This condition was especially prevalent in Marion, Smith, and Van Zandt 
counties. 
With respect to the Democratic clubs' "political meetings and 
barbecues," speakers from the podium at those functions named those who 
were targeted for Klan violence. The accused knew that they must flee 
or die. 
The lack of adequate transportation and communication facilities 
"between remote points," Reynolds reported, was advantageous to the Klan 
and to lawlessness in general. Favorable local opinion on behalf of the 
Klan and armed bands was another factor allowing their existence and 
promoting their increase. The situation was so bad that Reynolds 
strongly believed that no one living outside Texas would be able to 
understand the depth of lawlessness without experiencing it first 
hand. 27 
Probably, because of its strong history of intemperance toward 
minorities, Texas would have experienced the degree of lawlessness that 
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it did after the war even if the Klan had not existed. The violence 
committed against Texas Germans, Mexicans, and Union men during the war 
was one indication that such would have been the case. Another factor 
was the attitudes of white Texans toward blacks. To many Afro-American 
would always be a slave or a subservient creature regardless of whether 
or not the government had granted blacks• emancipation. 
Major General Henry W. Halleck, from his headquarters in 
Louisville, Kentucky, stated many times that outlaws rode under the 
banner of the Ku Klux Klan in order to give themselves a psychological 
edge over their intended victim. This does not mean that they had 
formally joined a particular Klavern, merely that the availability of 
the hood more than just the organization provided an additional weapon 
for the arsenal of wickedness, a cloak of anonymity which freed the 
wearer from inhibitions and added to the terror felt by the would be 
victim. At least a few Texans held a similar view to that of the 
general. 
An editorial in Flake•s Bulletin disagreed with the level of 
violence and crime as defined by Reynolds. The editor felt that 
lawlessness in Texas occurred on a much smaller scale than indicated by 
the general. However, the journalist did contend that the situation was 
worse than the average "native" Texan cared to admit. 28 Many Texans 
sanctioned that lawlessness through either tacit support or a do-nothing 
attitude. From Clarksville, Texas, in Red River County to Mount 
Pleasant, Texas, in Titus County, a ruffian by the name of Elisha Guest 
terrorized the vicinity. Finally the army sent troops to apprehend 
Guest. The military followed the outlaw to Mount Pleasant. In that 
town they found, to their presumed dismay, that the townspeople had 
taken up arms against the army. Townsfolk were totally sympathetic to 
Guest. Likewise, in Bell County, area residents warned the local gang 
whenever army patrols approached. 29 
Other townspeople were too afraid of local outlaws to cross them. 
In Boston, Texas, located in Bowie County, the outlaw Cullen Baker 
36 
literally controlled the town. Rumor had it that people there were too 
afraid to even speak his name out loud. And Trinity County, in east 
central Texas, was also in a state of chaos. All citizens were armed. 
No life or property was considered safe. And authorities were likewise 
f .d 30 a ra1 . 
The fundamental basis for violence in Texas in 1868 was the 
presence of elements for whom conflict had long since become 
traditional. Pro-secessionists, slavery supporters, 
anti-Reconstructionists, white Southern Democrats, or rebels--whatever 
the term, most were interchangeable--still remained bitter toward the 
anti-secessionists, abolitionists, Radical Republicans, and Unionists or 
loyalists. That was particularly true in 1868 with Congressional 
Reconstruction well under way. 
John Hope Franklin, in his book~ Slavery to Freedom: ~History 
of Negro Americans, felt that it was this factor above all others which 
caused the resurgence in violence throughout the South, not just in 
Texas, in 1867 and 1868. Under Presidential Reconstruction, Southern 
whites believed that there was hope. And the slogan, "the South shall 
rise again" could become a reality. When the events of Reconstruction 
became unbearable, they could voice their opinions to the president, who 
was often sympathetic. But "when Radical Reconstruction made this 
impossible .•. they struck with fury and rage." 31 In Franklin•s opinion 
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this conflict of traditional elements was highly political in origin, a 
battle for "control of the South." It, in the Northern perception, 
involved a struggle against rebel attempts to nullify gains arising from 
the war. The Southern view was that the issue centered on home rule. 
Of course, the Southern definition of home rule contained a whites only 
proviso; blacks were by that same definition unfit and inept. To 
Southerners it was inconceivable that consideration could even be given 
to the notion that freedmen would be placed in such a situation. 32 
Although European and Mexican immigrants to Texas received more 
than their share of the atrocities committed by white terrorists, 
freedmen remained the target of violence. For some whites the concept 
of race war served as justification for the outrages. Too much 
influence by Northerners on blacks could only lead to trouble. 
Afro-Americans needed constant reminding of their natural place in life 
lest the blacks start believing Northern propaganda and, in their 
ignorance, rise against their betters. Freed or not, blacks were to be 
nothing more than unskilled workers in a predominantly white and fully 
dominant white society. Thus most whites chose to believe. If 
legislative measures proved insufficient or unavailable, illegal 
channels were available to guarantee the survival of this state of 
affairs. 33 
While stationed in Texas Major General George A. Custer observed 
that homicides against blacks occurred "weekly, if not daily." Despite 
the opinions of observers in the field and despite the availability of 
house documents, Coulter reached conclusions opposite from what an 
open-minded reading of the statistical evidence warranted. In his 
perception it was whites, not blacks, who suffered in Texas from 1865 to 
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1868. 34 Support by Coulter of William A. Dunning's long ago refuted 
theory of Southern reconstruction seemingly distorted Coulter's 
understanding of what transpired in the Lone Star State during the 
period under examination. Those older historians would have us believe 
that Southern whites, noble in war and dignified in defeat, had come to 
terms with the reality that they would have to accommodate, even 
sacrifice, to keep their newly freed slaves from self-harm. Further, in 
this view, vindictive and greedy Northerners used the ignorant blacks as 
a pawn in a heinous game of despoliation of the serene if devastated 
Southern homeland and forced the long-suffering white population with 
great reluctance to arise and throw off the tyrannical rule of the 
Northern usurpers and their ebony foils. If such were the case, then 
the statistics for the period in question, a time when the outrages of 
the Reconstruction governments should have been most blatant, must 
reflect that the predominance of violent acts was in fact directed 
against former Confederates and their sympathizers. The agents of that 
violence, for the Dunning and Coulter interpretation to stand, must be 
blacks, carpetbaggers, and other alien elements. Connivance in the 
activity by the military and the bureau should appear at least to a 
small degree. However, nothing in the evidence supports or hints at 
such a reality. Dunning's theory of Southern reconstruction is neither 
explanation nor justification for the violence in Texas in 1868. On the 
contrary, reports of outrages by whites against blacks were numerous. 
General Reynolds, in his annual report for 1868, stated "The murder 
of negroes is so common as to render it impossible to keep accurate 
account of them." 35 Agents of the Freedman's Bureau, military 
personnel, journalists, citizens, and blacks themselves told of crimes 
and of the Ku Klux Klan. Klaverns such as the Sons of Washington, the 
White Camellia, the Teutonic Band of Brothers, and the Knights of the 
Rising Sun patrolled various Texas regions both day and night. They 
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ended Republican meetings and attacked government representatives. The 
Knights of the Rising Sun 11 hunted down without mercy .. loyalists and 
Texas Germans. They committed arson, robbery, and murder. Klansmen 
used force and intimidation. Nothing was beyond their capacity for 
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v1c1ousness. 
In Lamar County subagent DeWitt C. Brown had his horse shot out 
from under him by Klansmen. Threats against him continued until Brown 
left Paris, Texas, shortly thereafter. In Tarrant County the Ku Klux 
Klan organized in 1868. More than 200 members joined. They marched 
through Fort Worth and roamed the countryside, committing the usual 
disturbances. This Klavern became so strong and so successful in 
threatening the Afro-Americans that many blacks, although emancipated, 
remained with their old masters and would not travel without passes. 
Freedmen caught out after dark could anticipate that the local Klansmen 
would beat them and return them to their .. owners, .. provided that they 
remained alive. One lawmaker, Judge B. F. Barkley, tried to enforce at 
least a semblance. of justice. Accordingly, threats against him were so 
numerous that he had to have military troops escort him to and from the 
courthouse. 37 
Some area whites did attempt to stop the Klan of Tarrant County. 
The motivation for this bold venture was not, however, concern for the 
human rights of the blacks. Rather, the goal was protection of black 
labor and property. Landowners had to act because conditions had become 
so unbearable that black workers were afraid to leave their quarters to 
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go to work. In retaliation for Klan disruption of his labor supply, one 
rancher Harris, between Fort Worth and Cleburne, took action. First he 
had his black and white laborers dig a trench. Then he armed the men 
and had them lay in ambush for the Klan, which he knew would venture his 
way on its routine nightly ride. When, as expected, the Klansmen 
entered the area, the surprise was complete. Harris and his men wounded 
twelve and sent the others fleeing. After that confrontation with a 
small band of men willing to fight back, the Klan of Tarrant County rode 
no more at night. 38 
In Limestone County in February of 1868, a man named "Dixie" had 
the reputation as a one-man Klan. In an attempt to avenge the South, he 
murdered all freedmen he encountered. The total number of blacks who 
met their death at his hands is unknown. But blacks did become so 
fearful of him that they slept in the woods at night. Finally an area 
resident, Merret Trammell, went to Waco. He returned with troops, and 
in a shootout Dixie was killed. 39 
Murders of blacks occurred in a widespread area by March of 1868. 
Armed bands calling themselves Ku Klux Klan murdered and "practiced 
barbarous cruelties upon the freedmen." In that one month, according to 
government documents, forty-two reported murders or assaults took place. 
The figure for criminal acts against whites, in contrast, was less than 
half of that number. Furthermore, in Bastrop County alone the number of 
unreported murders of blacks in that single month was too great to 
estimate. 40 
By April of 1868, Southern Democrats and white conservative Texas 
journalists had begun an attempt to cover up the extent. even the 
existence, of the Klan and its brutalities. In The Daily State Gazette 
of April 17, 1868, an editqrial claimed that the Klan existed only in 
the minds of Radical Republicans. The Loyal League, not the Ku Klux 
Klan, was the source of the problems in Texas. By May and June the 
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Gazette openly admitted to the reality of the Klan. Backing the Klan's 
activities, the Gazette claimed that the Ku Klux Klan could stop not 
only the loyal League but black domination as we11. 41 
The Denton Monitor, in May, ran a similar story line pertaining to 
the Loyal League. The Ku Klux Klan was a trick by the Radical 
Republicans. It was the Loyal League, not Southern Democrats, who were 
in charge of the Klan. The Denton Monitor repeated the article in 
September of 1868. 
Texas newspapers stepped up their propaganda in June. The Houston 
Telegraph printed that the Loyal League's goal was "to put through" all 
freedmen who voted conservatively. The Daily State Gazette define "put 
through" as to punish or murder. 42 
Simultaneously the state government, in June, finally admitted that 
it was powerless to handle the internal situation in Texas. In a letter 
to General Reynolds, Governor Elisha M. Pease declared that neither life 
nor property was safe in Falls County. Daily, blacks and Unionists were 
attacked. Pease asked General Reynolds for help. Pease further 
requested aid in the investigation of a murder in Johnson County. 43 
A. R. Wilson was a freedman who resided in Burleson, Texas. Very 
intelligent and influential among area blacks, Wilson worked as 
Registrar of the Court of Burleson. Wilson was kidnapped and 
murdered. 44 
In Hunt and Fannin counties Unionists and blacks, along with their 
entire families, were driven out of the area. Their tormentors 
confiscated their property and possessions. In Anderson County the 
district attorney refused to indict criminals for assaults against 
blacks or unionists. Even with sworn affidavits proving a case, he 
declined to prosecute. If a case did reach the court, he forced the 
case into lengthy litigation. For example, an assault case which 
occurred in 1867 finally reached the grand jury in 1868. 45 Similar 
situations were common throughout Texas. 
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By means of correspondence from the Detroit Post, the New York 
Times published the report of Charles Haugh, subagent for the Freedmen's 
Bureau at Waco, who highlighted problems in his district. In Falls 
County unknown whites shot black laborers at one Dodson's Plantation on 
June 6, 1868. Unionists were murdered for "just being union men." On 
June 10, near Waco, a P. Mosier shot at Thornton Scott, forcing Scott to 
leave his own land. Mosier wanted freedman Scott's property and the 
crop which Scott had raised. Bureau agents apprehended Mosier. But 
officials later released him. Mosier swore that he was in the field 
shooting into the air. He was not aiming at Scott. In fact, he 
claimed, he did not even know that Scott was on the property. 46 
Three men--Bickerstaff, Ellis, and Boardman--went on a crime spree 
while traveling through Navarro County. Officials incarcerated them at 
Corsicana for robbing six blacks which they met on the road of all their 
possessions. After finding out that the three robbers had served under 
the Confederacy in the late war, no justice of the peace would sit as 
judge. After all, the victims were merely "d d niggers," and no 
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freedmen could testify against a white. There were no other witnesses 
than the parties directly involved. Released, the bandits continued 
their plunder of Navarro County. They shot two blacks near Spring Hill, 
robbed five more freedmen and their families--forcing the women to 
disrobe--and stole four horses. On July 4, after shooting and robbing 
one Henry Carruther, Bickerstaff, Ellis, and Boardman again were again 
confronted by law enforcement officials. The three again went to jail 
but again won their release. The reason was predictable: they had 
bb d 11 d d • II d th II 1 • "d "47 ro e a n1gger, an ere was on y n1gger ev1 ence. 
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In late July near Waco, whites fatally wounded Marion Chapman, a 
freedman. The Waco sheriff, four deputies, and bureau agent Haugh went 
to arrest the allegedly guilty men at Bosqueville. On their arrival, 
the six law enforcement officials found 150 armed men protecting the 
fugitives. Haugh and his associates had no choice but to retreat. 48 
These instances were only a few of the outrages Haugh reported. 
Unionists, freedmen, and bureau agents were constantly threatened, 
beaten, whipped, robbed, or murdered. Blacks did not report all such 
abuse to the authorities. Freedmen received warning from the terrorists 
not to repeat the threats and so on to officials. The whites would 
return the next time to kill the freedmen if the blacks gave any details 
to the authorities. It seemed that electing Ulysses S. Grant as 
President of the United States and sending General Phil Sheridan to 
Texas was the only way to solve the problems of the Lone Star State. At 
least such was the editorial comment in the New York Times. 49 
In Smith County grown men attacked black children who were on their 
way to Mary Stripling's school in Tyler. The assailants beat the 
children with clubs and threw stones. The motive for that assault was 
that the children failed to get off the sidewalk when whites walked 
past. Freedpeople were to walk in the road. Authorities closed the 
school after receiving several threats that the school would be burned 
down with the children inside if it remained open. Furthermore, 
Freemen's Bureau Agent Lieutenant Gregory Barrett received a warning 
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from cowed freedmen who feared for their lives. A full scale war would 
break out in the county if military officials arrested even one 
anti-Reconstructionist. According to the report, rebels in Tyler 
intended to murder .. a 11 yankees and ni ggers if necessary ... so 
Attacks on Freedmen's Bureau schools occurred in Williamson County 
also. After the burning of a schoolhouse at Circleville, Texas, on June 
28, 1868, Reynolds offered a reward. He would give $500.00 for 
information leading to the conviction of the culprit and culprits. In 
Anderson County as in Williamson County, hostility to the freedmen's 
schools was overt. Whites there drove the organizer of a black school 
out of town. Once again Governor Pease had to ask Reynolds for help. 
If attacks on freedmen and innocent school children continued without 
retribution, the governor knew, freedpeople would never attain a sense 
f •t 51 o secun y. 
In Grimes and Waller counties the Klan continued their attacks on 
blacks and the educational system for freedmen. At Hempstead, L. S. 
Dickinson observed a freedman with a bruised head. Welts on his arms 
showed where once he had been bound. The Klan had beaten him and left 
him for dead. And in Navasota, according to reports, a black went crazy 
from fright. However, despite the abuses at least one area resident 
felt that some improvement had occurred in white acceptance of black 
education. On the other hand, in July Klansmen, this group calling 
itself the Knights of the Rising Sun, broke up black schools in 
Jefferson and outside Marshall in Marion and Harrison counties. Federal 
authorities sent troops to protect the school in Marshall. It remained 
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the only school in operation in the district. 52 
The economic factor cannot be overlooked as a reason for the amount 
of crime in Texas in June. Blacks were ready to harvest summer crops. 
By driving the freedmen off the land, usually after the hard work was 
complete, whites could get the profit without the exertion. Many blacks 
had worked with the understanding that they would receive wages at the 
completion of harvest. Expelling these workers would serve as another 
money-saving venture for whites. Blacks were not only losing their land 
but also their livelihood and often their yearly wages. This 
circumstance proved especially true in Harrison, Upshur, Titus, Rusk, 
and Panola counties. 53 
There was also a political motive for increased attacks on freedmen 
and Unionists in the late summer and early fall of 1868--the 
constitutional convention. Elimination of the black vote was of utmost 
importance. Whites in Kaufman County threatened to kill all black 
radicals. Hunt County whites did more than threaten; they killed 
Unionists and ordered blacks to leave the county. In July a riot 
occurred at Millican, Texas. Before it ended whites had murdered 
twenty-five blacks. A speaker traveling from Goliad to Victoria to 
appear at a Unionist meeting met with a confrontation. Whites 
threatened him with hanging if he dared to participate. Similar 
incidents occurred in Upshur, Wood, Grimes, Hunt, and Fannin counties. 54 
The city of Jefferson in Marion County was also the site of a riot. 
The trouble started when freedmen and loyalists held a Fourth of July 
celebration. Democrats were holding a "Rebel Barbecue" in honor of the 
holiday. The Democrats tried unsuccessfully to get blacks to join the 
Democratic Club of Marion County. When only thirteen freedmen appeared 
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at the barbecue, angry whites went in search of the other blacks. Mobs 
formed. They chased Unionists and Afro-Americans out of town. Whites 
then established patrols to guard the town. By keeping undesirables out 
of town, they prevented the unionists and blacks from voting for 
delegates to the convention. 55 
Other reports of so-called race wars filled the papers. In 
northeast Texas the Bickerstaff gang, along with outlaw Bob Lee, made 
headlines. In Paris, Texas, those outlaws put up a public notice of 
their mutual goal. That objective was to murder all freedmen between 
the Red River and Sandlin Creek. Bickerstaff and associates did not 
limit their campaign only to freedmen. They murdered all black women 
and children that they encountered. Union men also became their 
victims. Those whom they wounded could not get assistance. Doctors 
would not help either out of their own prejudice or out of fear. 
Sympathetic whites would not help either. They were too afraid of being 
labeled Unionist and winding up shot because of it. Those blacks who 
had weapons and ammunition ended up disarmed by whites. Blacks were 
totally defenseless. Consequently, the bandits drove freedpeople from 
their homes. Area residents, black and white alike, feared even to send 
letters through the mail. The local newspapers noted that "The 
postmasters are all Ku Klux." 56 
The Daily Austin Republican lamented that race wars prevailed even 
in Travis and Bastrop counties. Travis County contained Austin, the 
state capital. Bastrop County was adjacent to Travis County on the 
southeast. The Ku Klux Klan had reached even into those counties, the 
seat of government. Freedpeople even that close to the center of power 
and authority could no longer regard themselves as exempt from 
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violence. 57 
The situation in Tyler, Texas, became critical by the end of July. 
Lieutenant Gregory Barrett described Smith County as plunged into "open 
warfare." The whole town was armed and threatening to eradicate all 
Yankees in the area. When Barrett arrested a white, George Kennedy, on 
July 19 for the rape of a black woman, Klansmen and townspeople came to 
Kennedy•s aid. They killed two soldiers and a clerk. Barrett barely 
escaped with his life. The two soldiers received critical wounds, and 
the clerk suffered a slight injury. Barrett pleaded for more troops. 
He sent his request by special dispatch. The Klan controlled the 
telegraph. 58 
Throughout September Barrett found himself unable to control Smith 
County and the surrounding area. In August Klan parties of twenty men 
each raided the county. No black could regard himself as safe. 
Klansmen shot freedpeople on sight. Conditions continued to 
deteriorate. The Starville Klan, headed by the Chauncey brothers and 
operating from that city located fifteen miles east of Tyler, terrorized 
the town. The locality was totally out of control for ten days. Men, 
women, and children were flogged. Individuals received as many as 500 
lashes apiece. 
Area Ku Klux Klan bodies planned a joint meeting for September 12. 
Barrett feared a riot. Again he sent his message of concern by letter. 
The enemy remained in firm control of the telegraph. Meanwhile, blacks 
underwent a "reign of terror." 59 
If the situation in Tyler and Smith County was not desperate 
enough, Bickerstaff and his gang moved into lower Hunt, Van Zandt, and 
Wood counties. There area Klaverns aided Bickerstaff in his barbarism. 
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There was, at that point, no protection at all for blacks in at least 
four counties around Tyler. Furthermore, the few troops which were 
stationed in Tyler could not be moved away from that city. Barrett was 
too afraid that a race riot if he redistributed his troops. By October 
of 1868 the situation was hopeless. Barrett no longer served as 
subagent as of that month. No reason was given, and the record was 
unclear as to whether he was transferred or murdered. 60 
Elsewhere, the Teutonic Band of Brothers aided conservative clubs 
in Houston to promote enrollment in those clubs of Harris County blacks. 
Two circles of the Knights of the White Camellia also assisted. 
Klaverns met weekly. However, despite those efforts, area blacks failed 
to be intimidated. 61 
Aside from the situation confronting Barrett in Tyler in September, 
the next most severe episode pertained to conditions in Jefferson, 
Texas. There the Knights of the Rising Sun announced the installation 
of their Grand Officers. They scheduled the ceremony for September 19. 
On that day approximately 1,500 people arrived to attend the 
installation ceremony. Townspeople decorated the town for the occasion. 
Smaller klaverns such as the Lone Star Club and the Seymour Knights 
attended to show their respect and pay homage to the Knights of the 
Rising Sun. Even blacks participated in the ceremonies. 
Willis McNair, a local barber, was one of the speakers. The Texas 
Republican, which reported the affair, gave no details of McNair's 
speech. Further, it was unknown if he had been coerced into giving the 
talk. Or, perhaps, he did so in an attempt to pacify and appease the 
whites. Only speculation can be made. 
Klan officers elected for the year included Colonel W. P. Saufley 
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as the Grand Commander. Doctor A. S. Huey became the new Vice Grand 
Commander. Saufley•s background was a notorious one. An ex-Confederate 
officer, Saufley was a fugitive from the law. Federal authorities 
wanted him for murders committed in states other than Texas. Perfectly 
safe in Jefferson, Saufley was a favorite son, a pillar of the 
community. He also served as chairman of the self-styled Executive 
Committee of Marion County. 62 
September 1868 witnessed the formation of the Ellis County Klan. 
The Ku Klux Klan there made its nightly "ghostly" visits to Red Oak 
Settlement. Nevertheless, violence there did not reach anywhere near 
the proportions that it did in neighboring Navarro, Kaufman, Van Zandt, 
Wood, and Smith counties. 63 
The citizens of Van Zandt County underwent a near political war at 
that time. Radicals and conservatives were literally shooting it out in 
the streets of Canton. 64 
In Williamson County, the northern neighbor of Austin and Travis 
County, George Rouser organized "Democratic Clubs." Members really 
belonged to the Knights of the White Camellia. Statistics are as 
follows: 
"Club 1" 
"Club 2" 
"Club 3" 
"Club 4" 
Georgetown 
Round Rock 
Florence 
Willie•s Creek 
est. Sep 13 
est. Sep 13 
est. Oct 5 
no date 
members-101 
members- 31 
members- 52 
members- 8 
Back in northeast Texas, the Knights of the Rising Sun remained 
active. The violence in Marion County came to a peak at Jefferson, 
Texas because of an incident surrounding George Smith, an Unionist and 
black sympathizer. Freedmen helped to elect Smith as a delegate to the 
state•s constitutional convention. While speaking at a Republican 
meeting on the night of October 3, "Colonel" Richard P. Crump and his 
followers assaulted Smith and several blacks. In self-defense Smith 
wounded two of his assailants while the others fled. However, local 
officials arrested Smith as the perpetrator of the disturbance. Civil 
authorities placed him in the county jail after assuring military 
personnel that Smith would be safe--nothing proved farther from the 
truth. 66 
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On the night of October 4, 120 members of the Knights of the Rising 
Sun, led by Colonel William P. Saufley, broke into the jail. Military 
officials later investigated and confirmed the murder of four 
prisoners--Smith and three freedmen. With this last act General 
Reynolds made effective immediately General Order Number 15. 67 
All civil officers with the jurisdiction to make arrests were to do 
so on the spot. The target was any person concealed by mask or other 
disguise. Reynolds also included in the directive a provision that it 
applied to all ranking military commissioned officers no matter their 
rank. On arrest, any violator was to remain in custody. The arresting 
officer would report the full details of his arrest to headquarters. 
Then he would await further instructions. 68 
Although this arrangement looked good on paper, it proved to be 
impractical in the field, especially in counties such as Marion and 
Smith. In those counties Klansmen and outlaws outnumbered all available 
civil and military personnel by a significant ratio. Application of the 
order could not occur without providing at least adequate, preferably 
more, manpower to back up the effort to stop violence. With no regard 
whatsoever for the recently enacted order, in mid-October fifty Klansmen 
attacked the Willis Whitaker plantation, twelve miles north of 
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Jefferson. The hooded men killed seven blacks, wounded three more, 
burned the cotton gin, and set forty bales of cotton ablaze. Whitaker, 
a Unionist, had settled in Marion County from Arkansas. 69 
A do-or-die atmosphere enveloped Texas by November of 1868. That 
month was especially important due to the presidential elections then 
taking place. In their efforts to stop the election of Grant, according 
to Coulter, the Klan merited praise. As he said: 
The political activities of the Klan, especially in the 
Presidential election of 1868, struck terror into Northern 
Radicals, for here was a direct threat to the Southern support 
which th'M had built up by their whole Reconstruction 
Program. 
If Grant had been defeated, and had the Klan and its supporters not 
committed the inhumane acts in the proportions that. they did, then the 
Ku Klux Klan might have merited Coulter•s praise and admiration. But 
Grant did become president. Northerners rejoiced. Radical Republicans 
felt that this event would be the turning point. Victory in Texas would 
be slow in coming. 
Major activity against blacks occurred in Nacogdoches in late 
November. On the night of Novembe~ 30, Klansmen there went on a 
terrorist spree. At least two blacks died. The .. unidentified menu 
severely beat six freedmen. They also confiscated property. 
Subassistant commissioner Alex Ferguson requested troops. The situation 
in Nacogdoches became worse after the presidential election. Whites 
publicly announced their intention to dispose of Loyal Leaguers. 
71 Afterward, whites could manage and control blacks as they chose. 
With the coming of December, all the military and troubled citizens 
of Texas could do was hope that 1869 would bring relief to the troubled 
state. Klansmen and outlaw gangs operating either dependently or 
independently of local Klaverns continued operations. Many areas 
remained out of control--northeast, east, central, and south central. 
Unionists, freedmen, soldiers, and bureau agents continued to be 
threatened, beaten, robbed, whipped, drowned, shot, mutilated, 
ostracized, and intimidated. 
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The economic factors had had their season. Spring and summer crops 
had long been harvested. Yearly salaries had long been paid. Still the 
violence continued. 
Political factors had diminished as well. The constitutional 
convention, with its delegate elections in February and its sessions 
themselves in June, had adjourned. The presidential election of 
November 1868 was over. Still the violence remained. 
Ex-slaveholders fought abolitionists. Rebels fought unionists. 
Democrats fought Radical Republicans. Whites murdered blacks, Germans, 
Mexicans, and anyone else who posed a threat, real or imagined, to white 
Southern supremacy. The violence would not end for years to come. 
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CHAPTER III 
NO RESPITE 
During 1868 and 1869 violent crimes numbered in the thousands. 
Throughout the South Klansmen murdered twenty thousand freedpeople--
including women and children--from 1868 through 1871. Blacks, 
Unionists, and representatives of the law who tried to aid those 
suffering persecution endured over ten thousand lesser crimes. In Texas 
alone, friends, relatives, and other witnesses reported 384 killings 
from January to October 1869. J. J. Reynolds singled out the Ku Klux 
Klan as the primary instigator of the criminal violence in the 
particularly troubled counties of northeast Texas from 1868 through 
1869. Despite the odds, law enforcement officials increased their 
efforts to decrease crime. 1 
One observer in the South declared the control of crime to be 
impossible. According to that source, the judicial system did as much 
Ku-Kluxing as did the hooded, torch-carrying men on the town streets and 
country roads throughout the South. Many local and state officials 
remained reluctant to prosecute. Reynolds was determined to stop the 
violence in Texas. The military continued to use its commission to rid 
Texas of crime. Between October of 1868 and September of 1869, the 
military commission reviewed fifty-nine cases. The felony under 
examination in each case was either murder or aggravated assault. 
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Acquittals outnumbered convictions by a ratio of almost two to one. 2 
Despite the optimistic and enthusiastic attitudes of military leaders 
and modern historians--Reynolds and Sefton respectively--the picture was 
still bleak. 
Texas reported 400 murders in the first ten months of 1868. Yet 
the military commissions achieved only twenty-one convictions for both 
murder and aggravated assault during a twelve-month period. It was 
clear that the removal of crime, or at least its decrease to an 
acceptable level, would be a long drawn out process. 
As a start toward dismantling the structure of strife, General E. 
R. S. Canby divided Texas into twenty-eight districts. Each post was to 
have an individual commander and ''sufficient military force." Civil and 
military officials were to interact. Civil law was to serve as the 
chief deterrent to crime. Military tribunals would take over when local 
authorities failed to act. The majority of posts, however, remained in 
the frontier region despite Canby's presumed commitment to the reduction 
f . 3 o cr1me. 
Canby's directiv~. as others before it, had its problems. Before 
the Congressional Committee on Reconstruction, General J. J. Reynolds 
declared that in Texas "civil law is a dead letter." Reynolds called 
the Ku Klux Klan an "armed political organization." Furthermore, the 
group was a recognized division of the Democratic bureaucracy, 
sanctioned and approved by conservative leaders. According to Reynolds, 
crime, violence, and Klan outrages remained prevalent. Conditions in 
the Texas interior continued out of control. 4 Evidence from Texas 
seemed to support the position expressed by Reynolds. 
Klansmen and white supporters of the terroristic group continued 
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their attacks on blacks and black institutions such as schools and 
churches. Near Troupe, Texas, located six miles from Jamestown in Smith 
County, the Klan attacked the congregation at a black church. Freedmen 
and their families were at Hopewell Church to listen to the sermon of 
the Reverend Mr. Lively, a Methodist preacher. As they left the church, 
the blacks found themselves confronting "a group of chivalry" which 
began firing into the crowd. One black died from wounds sustained in 
the episode. The intruders singled out other freedmen and robbed them 
of their clothes. 5 
Black witnesses named James Gilliam, who lived near Jamestown, as 
one of the assailants. Gilliam went after the three blacks who gave 
testimony against him. On finding one of the freedmen working in a 
field, Gilliam shot the freedman in the back with a shotgun. After 
running out of ammunition, the Klansmen shot the black man in the head 
from close range with a derringer. 6 
Cullen Baker and his gang continued their terrorization of 
northeast Texas throughout 1869. Determined to capture the bandits, 
authorities sent out a scouting party to find Baker and his cohorts. 
The scouting party consisted of two officers and six enlisted men under 
the command of Major Wirt Davies. The party had limited initial 
success, apprehending one member of the gang. Baker, however, remained 
at large, at least temporarily. The posse continued its search for one 
month in Bowie and surrounding counties. On December 23, 1868, the 
posse received reinforcements when ten more enlisted men and their 
commander joined Davies and his search party. On approximately January 
1, 1869, a coalition of citizens joined the military personnel in the 
attempt to apprehend Baker. Heading the civilian group was John 
Chamblee. To better cover the ground, the two groups split. Chamblee 
and his detail showed up on January 7, 1869, with the bodies of Cullen 
Baker and the remainder of his gang. John Chamblee and one Thomas Orr 
received the reward that had been put up for Baker's apprehension or 
death. 7 
Much the same situation confronted blacks in Texas in 1869 as had 
prevailed in 1868. Freedmen repeatedly fell victim to robberies. 
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Whites claimed that the reason for the frequency of robbery against 
blacks was that the blacks provided easy targets. Also, rebels seemed 
to tire of murdering Unionists. It was more fun to run the undesirables 
out of town. In doing so, the ex-Confederates could not only 
incorporate the elements of fear and intimidation into their behavior. 
They could also publicly humiliate the loyalists as they chased them 
away. In effect, the only time that a black or a Unionist had even an 
approximation of safety was when a garrison of troops stood near at 
hand. At least that was the contention of a district attorney in the 
northern part of the state. 8 
Throughout the middle of 1869, the Klan continued its attacks on 
black schools and churches. The situation had not changed from that of 
1868. In Kaufman County the Ku Klux Klan ran off the freed people then 
proceeded to burn the school to the ground. In Panola County, near 
Louisiana, local Klaverns forced blacks to flee. The reason for that 
action was reportedly that "the crops is (sic) made." Area civil 
authorities refused to do their duty. 9 
The outrages knew no geographical boundaries. In the Gulf coast 
county of Brazoria, freed people had no civil, religious, or social 
rights. They lacked, like other blacks, the protection of the law. On 
September 7, 1869, Chuck Deist, Harry Mason, Harry Perkins, and 
"friends" went to a black church near Columbia, Texas. Columbia was a 
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town located approximately twenty-five miles inland from the Gulf of 
Mexico, close to the Brazos River. The group•s intention was merely to 
break up the meeting of the blac~ congregation. But trouble erupted. 
Harry Mason told the Reverend Mr. Hardwell to cease the service. The 
meeting was closed. The congregation was to disband. As he spoke, 
Mason simultaneously drew his gun. The preacher grabbed for the weapon, 
and a struggle ensued. The gun discharged, striking no one. However, a 
freedman named Perry, standing nearby, raised his cane in defense of the 
Reverend Hardwell. After Klansmen told Perry to "Go to H_l," they 
proceeded to send him there. They shot Perry to death, his body riddled 
with holes. Blacks later went to the sheriff of Brazoria for aid. The 
sheriff responded that he had no intention of pursuing the bandits. The 
group which attacked the church numbered between sixty and seventy 
10 
men. 
In 1869 Texas citizens--whites and black alike--began to redirect 
their grievances. Local officials would not help when problems arose. 
The military, although sympathetic and definitely trying to do something 
to deter crime, remained ineffective. Despite the reallocation of 
troops by army headquarters, the majority of military personnel remained 
on the frontier. Those in command viewed the Comanche and Kiowa as a 
greater problem than Klansmen killing whites and blacks in the interior. 
In desperation the beleaguered citizens turned to Washington, D.C. 
In a letter to the secretary of the treasury, Texan George W. Hevey 
asked for government aid. Hevey requested that the President and his 
cabinet take a grave look at the situation in the Lone Star State. Law 
and order there was non-existent because of 
the combined forces of so-called Conservatives, Ex-rebels, Ku 
Klux, Democrats, Knights of the White Camelia, and all other11 
elements of opposition to the principles of republicanism ..• 
But help from the President by means of legislative measure would not 
occur until late in the spring of 1870 and throughout 1871. 
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On the state level, legislators were trying to resolve the problems 
of unrest. But those problems in Texas were numerous. The struggle was 
slow, and the battle was up hill. 
Qualified voters had elected delegates to the state's 
constitutional convention under Congressional Reconstruction in February 
of 1868. That convention adjourned on August 31, 1868, because it had 
run out of funds. Lawmakers dispersed without solving the key issues. 
While in session politicians divided among themselves in attempts to 
split Texas into separate states. The lawmakers debated endlessly the 
issue of the ab initio (null and void) status of the secession 
ordinance. And a great deal of time vanished forever in the pointless 
chartering of railroads. Occasionally, the legislature paused to hear 
grievances about the lawlessness on the rampage through the Lone Star 
12 State. 
Essential matters failed to attract legislative attention. The 
primary concerns--matters such as civil rights for blacks, dependable 
law and order, and a state constitution which was a prerequisite for the 
readmission of the state to the Union--these difficult issues which most 
Texans wanted resolved remained, rather, backburner matters for the 
Texas constitutional convention. 
With political chaos in the legislative body, there could be 
nothing else but social unrest outside of the capitol halls. Because 
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legislators spent three months arguing about minor details, they failed 
to have any positive effect on the violence outside their chambers. Had 
pro-black representatives forced the body to deal with the issue, in all 
probability by nothing more than a simple show of unity they could have 
had significant impact. They would have presented a unified front, one 
of the few solid blocs in the convention, and forced the majority to 
focus its diffused attention on the problems confronting the black 
. "t 13 m1nor1 y. 
That concentration of forces failed to materialize. The convention 
did, however, manage to draw itself together for at least a brief 
moment. Appropriation of funds by a special tax allowed the 
deliberations of that body to continue. Delegates reconvened the first 
Monday in December of 1868 with sufficient funding to survive through 
the end of February. Bickering over the same small matters resumed. 
Finally, on January 30, 1869, the legislators got down to the business 
at hand and drafted a state constitution. On February 8, 1869, 
forty-five of the ninety representatives signed the document. 14 
The state constitution provided for a governor with a four year 
term of office. Appointments for attorney general, court judges, and 
secretary of the state would be made by the state's highest elected 
official. The constitution abolished county courts. It provided 
funding for a public school system by means of the sale of public land, 
a poll tax, and 25 percent of state tax proceeds. Public education 
would be provided for all children six to eighteen years of age, 
15 
regardless of race and color. 
The efforts of A. J. Hamilton and his colleagues resulted in a 
black voting rights law without restrictions. According to that law, "a 
person's political status should not be affected by race, color, or 
former condition." Although the state constitution granted black 
suffrage, enforcing the provision would prove to be another matter 
t . 1 16 en 1re y. 
In November of 1869, Texas held elections. The people voted in 
favor of adoption of the constitution. The election also gave the 
gubernatorial seat to E. J. Davis, a Radical Republican. Republicans 
also held the majority in both houses of the legislature. 
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On January 8, 1870, Gerald J.J. Reynolds swore in the duly elected 
officials on a provisional basis. Reynolds convened the legislature of 
February 8 of the same year. The state legislature body promptly 
ratified the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States, due process and the right to vote, respectively. 
Morgan Hamilton and J. W. Flanagan received the Texas Senatorial 
positions. On March 30, 1870, President Grant accepted Texas as in 
compliance with the requirements for readmission. No longer were the 
governor, senators, and representatives provisional. All authority in 
the state once again fell to civil officials' jurisdiction as Reynolds 
formally transferred the responsibility on April 16, 1870. 17 
For the first time in years, the circumstances for the Lone Star 
State looked favorable. At least the situation looked favorable for 
white Texans. Wrote the Union Houston: 
Reconstruction has come to an end at last. There is no Andy 
Johnson 'policy,• no Trockmorton •confederate record,' no Jack 
Hamilton 'rebel coalition• in the present programme. Let the 
people of r~xas rejoice. •come thou with us, and we will do 
thee good. 
But for the freedpeople intimidation, terror, and violence remained 
widespread. It did not simply magically vanish in 1869 although, for 
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Texas, the zenith year of Klan terror was 1868. According to James 
Sefton in The United States Army and Reconstruction, the greatest period 
of Ku Klux Klan membership throughout the South was in 1870 and 1871. 
Further, Robert W. Shook contended in his article "The Federal Military 
in Texas, 1865-1870'' that 1870 to 1874 was a period of lawlessness and 
violence unsurpassed by an time before it. 19 
Despite the decrease in the number of press reports of Klan 
attacks, the level of violence remained relatively the same. 
Conservative or Democratic papers such as Flake's Daily Bulletin 
reversed their earlier claims about the existence of the Ku Klux Klan. 
Flake's had previously reported the heroism of the Knights of the White 
Camelia. However, by April of 1870 the newspaper was denying even the 
existence of the secret organization. Flake's claimed that the "White 
Camelia died laughing after Serious Democrats killed it with a joke."20 
Perhaps the premature reports of the Klan's demise came about because 
the Klan went under ground. However, the greater probability was that, 
with tacit support from whites, the Klan was merely a cover for 
violence. That violence would have existed with or without the 
appearance of a recognized organization such as the Ku Klux Klan and 
would have continued whether or not its front organization remained in 
existence. The reason for the seeming disappearance of the hooded 
organization was relatively insignificant. Of more import was the 
reality that Klan-like violence continued with the support and sanction 
of the white Southern community. 
The United States Congress in 1870 finally started to develop 
serious measures to deal with the Klan throughout the afflicted states. 
General Alfred House Terry spoke to Congress. Stated Terry: 
The entire United States Army would be insufficient to give 
prote~rion throughout the South to everyone in danger from the 
Klan. 
Terry's solution to the problem was to take one state which was 
particularly troubled by the Klan and concentrate all efforts in that 
area. By doing so, authorities could ,.make an example,. of Klansmen in 
that locale. Concentration of attention had a second benefit, aside 
from bringing some degree of control to the affected state, in that it 
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would serve as a warning to Klaverns in other states that their actions 
would be tolerated no longer. A third virtue of the plan, according to 
Terry, was that it would encourage the victims. Oppressed targets of 
Klan and Klan-like terror could- start to rid themselves of their fear. 
By showing the cowed populace that the Klan was not invincible, the 
eradication-by-concentration program would free the people to testify 
against the Klan without undue concern for the consequences. 22 
In May Congress passed the first legislative act intended to 
terminate Klan violence. According to that law, any person or persons 
using intimidation or any other method to interfere with or otherwise 
inhibit any individual from exercising his right to vote would be 
heavily penalized. Furthermore, it was illegal for a group of two or 
more to join efforts in order to intimidate or conspire. It was a 
felony to ride on private property or public roads in disguise. The 
determination of guilt and the punishment would be under the 
jurisdiction of federal rather than state courts. The army was to 
assist every federal marshal or commissioner, on request, to enforce the 
law. The President had available to him military force for use as he 
deemed necessary. 23 
The private sector decided to reorganize itself. Individuals 
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reestablished Loyal Leagues throughout Texas in 1870-1871. These 
peaceful organizations were identical to the earlier clubs which first 
appeared in Texas in 1867. The league had goals including the providing 
of a common front against violent foes and the giving of better service 
to the freedpeople. The Loyal League sought to educate blacks with 
respect to basic human rights and civil liberties. Area Conservative 
Clubs viewed the proceedings with consternation. In one instance, H. C. 
Hunt formed a Loyal League in Smith County. Hunt put all of his 
energies into the success of the League. Tyler, Texas, had been a 
center of turmoil under the auspices of Barrett and the Freedmen's 
Bureau. Although both violence and the visibility of the Ku Klux Klan 
had diminished in the intervening months, Hunt lived in constant fear of 
a Klan revival. Hunt had no intention of giving the Ku Klux Klan back 
the advantages it had enjoyed in its heyday during 1867 and 1868. Hunt 
and his colleague, Silas D. Wood, worked positively, keeping negative 
f t t . . 24 ac ors a a m1n1mum. 
Elsewhere the leagues flourished. W. M. Waddell established two 
Loyal Leagues. The first was at Palestine in Anderson County. The 
second was at Athens in Henderson County. Waddell claimed that the 
loyal people of those counties were not safe. Waddell further contended 
that Cherokee County, adjacent to Anderson County on the eastern border, 
was "in the hands of the Klux." Likewise, Lamar and Marion counties 
also formed Loyal Leagues. Loyalists of Lamar County based their 
headquarters at Paris, Texas. Their compatriots in Marion County set 
up operations at Jefferson. 25 
State representative C. D. Morris observed activities in Jefferson. 
He reported that the Loyal League had great strength in that town. A 
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high percentage of blacks participated. However, more than 200 freedmen 
worked on land in the southern part of the county. Those people 
remained totally isolated from politics and state and local events. 
Morris organized those blacks and got them to attend league meetings 
regularly. 26 
In 1871 the federal government passed legislation to stop the Ku 
Klux Klan and Klan-like violence. In February of 1871, Congress enacted 
a law providing for more direct federal supervision of Congressional 
elections. Further, Congress passed three new laws in April of the same 
year. According to the first, it was illegal to discourage an 
individual from the holding of public office, testifying in court, or 
serving on a jury, if the means of discouragement was intimidation. 
Secondly, the president had the power to send in unlimited numbers of 
military personnel to any troubled area. This provision applied to 
instances when turmoil and violence had become so severe as to obstruct 
federal laws and justice, and civil authorities could neither control 
nor stop the trouble at hand. Thirdly, the law provided that the 
president could suspend the right of habeas corpus in areas of such 
upheava1. 27 
Many whites in 1871 paid little attention to the legislation which 
the nation•s legislative body enacted. After all, it was a long way 
from the national capital to the small, rural towns of Texas. The 
whites in those towns did, however, pay attention to the goings-on of 
the local Loyal Leagues, meetings, and encouragement to "uppity" blacks. 
In Gonzales County, for instance, John Wesley Hardin, later to achieve 
fame if not distinction in a similar line of work, declared open warfare 
on the freedmen, "Yankee mob rule and misrule in general." He shot and 
killed two black state militiamen. Then he got serious, going on a 
rampage against those whom he had placed on his list of targets. 28 
Bastrop County also experienced a renewed wave of terror. The Ku 
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Klux Klan surged through the county, committing outrage after atrocity. 
They burned black schoolhouses, whipped teachers, and beat those who 
attended the schools. They found the parents of the students, then beat 
those parents for daring to send their children to school. 
In the resurgence of Klan violence, even Germans were not safe. 
The Klan of Bastrop County sought out the European immigrants and their 
descendants. Klansmen subjected the Germans to the same outrages--
intimidation, terror, and murder--as their black counterparts endured. 
Whites in the county, along with area officials, supported the 
local Klavern. The Bastrop grand jury refused even to indict anyone. 
Conveniently, there proved to be a lack of evidence. Local Republicans, 
including Governor E. J. Davis, objected to the findings of the grand 
jury, but to no avai1. 29 
Klansmen burned black schools in Calvert, Texas, in Robertson 
County. In Hill County at the town of Towash on October 21, 1871, yet 
another black school burned to the ground. Hill County had difficulty 
in acquiring qualified teachers and retaining them. White opposition 
was quite strong. Threats were continual, and once the schoolhouse had 
burned no one would rent space for the resumption of classes. 30 
Providing a backdrop to the resurgent Klan in Texas, the state's 
Republican party became increasingly preoccupied with its own survival, 
probably to the detriment of its efforts to squelch the violence. From 
1866 until 1870 Republicans had little to worry about. In the former 
year the rapidly conservative States rights Democrats had lost control 
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of their party to "moderates," the faction more inclined to forget the 
past and work with the new majority party. However, a postwar influx of 
unrepentant rebels from elsewhere in the South swelled the ranks of the 
Democrats. Most of the newcomers proved·to be attuned to the platform 
of the states• right wing, and the diehards regained control of the 
Democratic party. Worse for the Republican hopes was the fact that the 
new immigrants moved into areas which had previously been black 
Republican strongholds, becoming in some instances the majority of the 
county•s population. Republicans tried to whiten their liberal party, 
even making some effort to reestablish the link with the moderate 
Democrats. By trying to attract white support, the party managed 
primarily to alienate blacks and bosses who saw their patronage 
threatened and ambitions thwarted. Furthermore, the resurgent Democrats 
ran an effective campaign in 1871, charging corruption, an excessive tax 
burden (Davis had had to spend large amounts, at least in comparison to 
pre-war governmental expenditures, for his system of public schools and 
his state militia and police force), and abuse of power. More 
important, the Democrats proved proficient at intimidating potential 
voters at the polling places. The Democratic onslaught, coupled with 
Republican.divisiveness and disharmony, produced an astounding reversal. 
The Democrats swept all four of the state•s Congressional races and so 
intimidated the Republican-controlled state legislature that the 
lawmaking body switched to a conservative program, repudiating the 
liberal governor. Although the Republicans still controlled the state 
government, the tide had shifted. The Democrats were poised to rise 
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again on a platform of states• rights and limited government. When 
the people spoke against the state policing power and services to 
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blacks, they sent a clear message to their neighbors in the Klan. 
As previously stated, historians such as E. Merton Coulter and 
Charles W. Ramsdell denied the existence of Klan activity in Texas. 
Rupert Norval Richardson at least recognized the existence of the Klan 
in the Lone Star State. But he viewed it as basically a non-violent 
organization. In Richardson•s view, the Texas Klan was totally separate 
from the Klan found in the regions of the Old South. The goal of the 
Lone Star Klan was to oppose the Loyal Union League. The Klan•s mode of 
operation, according to Richardson, consisted of threats and 
intimidation. His implication seemed to be that those 11 threats and 
intimidation .. were relatively harmless. However, he did acknowledge 
that, 11 Like all such organizations the Klan got beyond the control of 
responsible leaders at times and there was bloodshed ... 32 
Nevertheless, despite his apology for Klan irresponsibility, 
Richardson did not recognize the existence of the Klan in Texas after 
1867, mid-1868 at the latest. Allen W. Trelease more correctly 
evaluated the Ku Klux Klan•s presence in Texas. He situated the main 
Klavern, the Knights of the Rising Sun, in its Jefferson (Marion County) 
headquarters. However, he erred in arguing that the Klan, despite 
sporadic outbursts in various areas of th~ Lone Star State, .. virtually 
disappeared at the end of 1868 ... 33 No one recognized Klan activity, 
Klan enrollment, or Klan-like violence in Texas in the year 1869 or 
later. Evidence suggests otherwise. 
On January 29, 1872, James P. Newcombe wrote a letter. Newcombe 
served as Secretary of State for the Great State of Texas. The 
addressee was the Honorable Job E. Stevenson, Washington, D.C. The 
secretary of state declared that the Ku Klux Klan was still active in 
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Texas. Newcombe defined the Klan as a "regular organized Ku-Klux 
organization." He claimed to know that membership was 15,000 to 20,000 
men. He also reported that state legislatures had enacted laws 
providing for more forceful enforcement. Crime was decreasing rapidly. 
More cases appeared daily on court dockets. More important, those cases 
resulted in more convictions. In Newcombe's opinion, provided that 
civil and federal sovereigns "encouraged and protected" the loyalty of 
Texas, "patriotism and duty" would prevai1. 34 
Lawmakers continued to claim that crime was decreasing. Journalist 
and later historian alike denied the existence of the Klan. Some whites 
put on airs of loyalty and renewed patriotism for the Republican cause. 
Yet freedman participation declined. Blacks became more introverted. 
The freedpeople were too fearful of the Ku Klux Klan. Whites continued 
to keep blacks submissive by means of threats and intimidation. In the 
elections of 1873, the Democratic party would be victorious. 35 
In the aftermath of the Democratic victories of 1871, Davis 
retreated. He sacrificed the state police and relinquished his power 
over the state militia. However, Davis did not do so before declaring 
martial law in Madison, Grimes, Hill, Walker, Freestone and Limestone 
counties after area residents and law enforcement agents would not or 
could not stop the violence and bring those responsible to tria1. 36 The 
people of Texas, already alienated by Davis's giveaway programs and 
desperate search for money to finance them, refused to return to the 
Republican column. And the trends continued: a black Republican party 
faced a white Democratic party with missionary zeal. Even the Germans 
had departed from the Republican ranks. And the national party, already 
split, had decided to bleach itself. A black party abandoned by its 
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national leadership faced certain doom at the polls. And electoral 
fraud and violence merely iced the cake at the Democratic victory party. 
The aftermath of the elections of 1873 and 1874 came as little surprise. 
Texas resumed its place in the Democratic column, and those who had 
placed the Republican usurpers into the seats of power had best beware. 
The final blow for the Republicans came when federal intervention came 
not on the behalf of the beleaguered governor but in support of those 
who unseated him. 37 
With the Democrats back in control and with a national government 
showing diminishing interest in the Reconstruction crusade for black 
equality, the mission of the Klan had prevailed. Accordingly, 
tranquillity should have returned to the Lone Star State. However, 
despite those who would argue that the Klan sought only to throw out the 
carpetbaggers and scalawags or those who would contend that the Ku Klux 
Klan had ceased to operate years earlier, even in the early years of 
Democratic Texas the pattern of violence, intimidation, and terror 
persisted. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
Historian Francis B. Simkins once declared that Southern Democrats 
succeeded in the 1874 Texas elections due to their violent 
organizations. Fraud was rife. And rioting plagued many areas. But 
the violence in that election differed not at all from what had gone 
before. And it strongly resembled the disturbances which would continue 
even after the Democrats had gained their victory. 
As late as 1876 Ku Klux Klan raids and Klan-like terror occurred in 
Grayson, Limestone, Van Zandt, ·and Wharton counties. For freedpeople in 
those counties, the nightmare continued. Circumstances remained the 
same. 
Black citizens of Sherman, Texas, circulated a petition. 
Twenty-eight Afro-Americans signed. W.H. Irving mailed the petition 
with its signatures to President Grant. Irving.added in a letter that 
the freedpeople of Sherman were both peaceful and industrious. Whites 
directed violence against blacks in the town of Sherman and throughout 
Grayson County. Both the petition and Irving attested to the state of 
affairs. Whites, because of prejudice, denied blacks the freedom to 
exercise their human and civil rights. Terrorists killed freedpeople 
often on the roads. No black was safe. A black minister, Professor 
Guilard, died by violent means. Whites murdered the man of the cloth 
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simply because he was black. 
In Van Zandt County, S.J. Richardson was the target of ostracism 
and intimidation. Richardson owned the Grand Saline in Van Zandt. 
According to the businessman, a "combination" existed in the coun~ 
which terrorized the blacks and drove them out of the region. The 
organization kept area proprietors from hiring freedpeople. The Klan 
accused Richardson of hurting the economy because of his practice of 
hiring blacks. Local authorities refused to do anything. The mob 
murdered blacks. Likewise, loyal men were not safe. The Ku Klux Klan 
was always disguised. In a group slaying, Klan members forced blacks to 
open their mouths. The disguised killers then put pistols into the 
blacks' mouths and fired the guns. Ex-governor Davis pleaded for 
federal intervention. 
Klan-like raids ended in tragedy for the people of Limestone 
County. The terror which re-emerged in May of 1875 lasted throughout 
the summer. Close to fifty blacks--including innocent women and 
children--met with violent deaths at the hands of area whites. 
Wharton County was in turmoil throughout 1876. White hatred for 
radicals, blacks, and anyone else who befriended the freedpeople reached 
an all time high. G.W. Schobey of Wharton County drew on himself the 
wrath of his neighbors. Townspeople hated Schobey for four reasons. 
First, he was a personal friend of ex-governor E.J. Davis. Second, he 
was a leading Republican in the area. Third, he had an extremely 
successful and prominent law practice. Fourth, both he and his wife 
taught voluntarily at the local black school. On January 29, 1876, two 
men murdered Schobey. An investigation into Schobey's death took place. 
Andrew J. Evans, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Texas, 
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attested that foul play had figured in the death of G.W. Schobey. The 
investigation further revealed that the motive for the murder was 
"hatred for radicals." One of the investigating officers was William J. 
Phillips, U.S. Marshall at Galveston. Phillips tried to capture the 
unnamed murderers. It was the marshall•s professional opinion that 
arrests of the felons would be impossible without military support. 
County officials refused to indict the killers due to fear of 
retaliation. The criminals had the support of the community. Witnesses 
were afraid to testify. Even the grand jury was afraid to issue 
indictments. Schobey•s killers remained free. 
Another traumatic chain of events focused around J.N. Bangham, a 
Republican. Bangham was the former sheriff of Wharton County. Friends 
persuaded him to run for public office. In the private sector he owned 
a store, and Robert Kyte served as his clerk. On election day, January 
7, 1876, a mob composed of 11 the leading Democrats .. of Wharton County 
forced Bangham to leave town. The mob shouted that they didn•t want any 
11 d d radicals .. in Wharton. Bangham appealed unsuccessfully to the 
sheriff. The 11 law enforcement .. officer sided with the mob. He hated 
radicals too. 
Ultimately Bangham left town. Later, he arrived in Austin, where 
he requested aid from Governor Richard Coke. Coke claimed that he was 
powerless to act in the situation. Bangham left Austin, settling in 
upper Wharton County on a farm near Colorado County. There he contented 
himself with remaining out of politics. He farmed the land with his 
former clerk, Robert Kyte, and opened a country store. 
Serious trouble followed Bangham. On approximately August 1, 1876, 
11 Unknown 11 assailants murdered two black youths as they rode their horses 
near James A. Frazier's store. Blacks formed an investigative group. 
Frazier panicked at the sight of freedmen approaching him. But the 
group merely questioned Frazier about who had been the last to see the 
boys alive. After the freedmen left, Frazier ran to his friends. 
81 
Alarmed and afraid, Frazier spread the rumor that the blacks intended to 
return with weapons and kill him and that they had surrounded his store. 
A mob formed with Frazier at its head, and the precondition for a race 
war was set. 
The whites blamed Bangham for helping to organize and arm area 
blacks. The mob--now Klan-like in its terrorism--shot and killed many 
blacks. Many of the Afro-Americans received cruel beatings before their 
deaths. It didn't matter that the freedmen were innocent. None were 
armed, and they had no intention of killing Frazier. They simply wanted 
to find out who had murdered the youths so that they could turn the 
responsible party or parties over to the authorities. 
Bangham, who had been in Washington County on the night of August 
1, returned to Wharton County some time later. On the night of August 
27, 1876, he was shot dead. Approximately fifteen men were involved in 
the conspiracy to murder Bangham. 9 
By the end of 1876, Kyte too was forced to leave Wharton County. 
Kyte went to Austin and pleaded for help on behalf of the freedpeople of 
Wharton. State officials did nothing. Coke again refused to act. The 
courts also refused to take action. The legislature tabled a bill which 
called for an investigation. 
At least twenty-four blacks died in the violent spree in Wharton 
County from August through September. During that same period only one 
white died--J. N. Bangham. In a letter to the state's attorney general, 
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former governor, E. J. Davis declared that Bangham's death was just the 
beginning. Whites had formed a conspiracy whose aim was the systematic 
killing of Republicans and blacks. 10 
By January of 1877, Texas had come full circle. The situation in 
the state on all levels was back to where it had been at the close of 
war in 1865. With the Compromise of 1877, Southern Democrats ended once 
and for all the Radical Republican campaign for liberal legislation 
which included civil and human rights. Had the powers to be formed a 
stronger, more positive coalition in the early years of Reconstruction, 
then perhaps the outcome would have been different. But they failed for 
three main reasons--prejudice, improper policing power, and missed 
opportunities. 
Northern Republican lawmakers failed to realize how deep the 
animosities ran. White Texans held their heritage dearly. Those who 
fought at the Alamo and Goliad had not merely died in battle; they were 
martyrs to a cause. That martyrdom gave the founders of Texas the right 
to rule and to rule in the way they so chose. That sovereignty made no 
allowance for rule by outsiders--Republicans, blacks, Mexicans, or 
Europeans. That vanguard of the Southern Democrats established a social 
hierarchy, and it reinstated white supremacy. No federal law could 
change that, for the people of Texas would not submit. 
The indecisiveness of the occupying military forces further aided 
in the collapse of the reconstructed South. Granted, the troops 
stationed in the Texas interior were in a no-win situation. White 
Texans did not want the "Yankees" there. And they made no effort to 
keep that opinion secret. Military organizations were powerless in the 
presence of unrest and lawlessness. Nothing could be done without going 
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through the customary military chain of command before a final decision 
or punishment could be rendered. That took days, if not weeks or 
months. Furthermore, there was no quick and reliable line of 
communication. In seasons of greatest trouble, the Ku Klux Klan or its 
conspirators controlled the telegraph and postal services. In many 
cases messages to Army headquarters had to go by special messenger. It 
was questionable if the dispatch could get through areas where the Klan 
heavily patrolled the roadsides. Most important was the fact that 70 
percent of the troops were assigned duty on the frontier in west Texas, 
not in the eastern or central regions of the state. 
Republicans missed two key opportunities. First was the use of the 
black militia. That branch of the military was under the jurisdiction 
of the governor. Since the militia could not have been used on the 
interior due to white attitudes toward blacks in position of power, an 
arrangement should have occurred whereby the black militia went to the 
frontier. Such a policy would have freed regular Army troops, primarily 
white, from their duties of watching the Indians and allowed them to 
police the interior, where lawlessness ran rampant. Second, had 
pro-black forces at the various state conventions formed a more unified 
front the minority in all probability could have succeeded against what 
was a clearly fragmented majority. State legislation backed by military 
strength might have diminished crime and violence. As it happened, 
nothing was unified except the Klan and unbridled prejudice. 
ENDNOTES 
1Francis Butler Simkins, Tne South Old and New, A History, 1820-
1947 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949)-. -p:zos:- - --
2w.H. Irving to Pres. U.S. Grant, n.d., 1876, in 44th Cong, 2d 
sess, House Executive Document No. 30 (551755), p. 137. 
3Edmond J. Davis, Austin, to Attorney General of the United States, 
January 14, 1875, 44th Cong., 2d sess, House Executive Document No. 30 
(551755), pp. 133-134. 
4E.J. Davis, Austin, to Alonzo Taft, attorney general, September 9, 
1876, 44th Cong., 2d sess, House Executive Document No. 30 (551755), p. 
143. 
5Mrs. Elizabeth Schobey, Austin, to Pres. U.S. Grant, February 5, 
1876, Andrew J. Evans to Edward Pierrepont, March 2, 1876, 44th Cong, 2d 
sess, House Executive Document No. 30, (551755), pp. 134-135. 
6william J. Phillips to Alphonso Taft, October 12, 1876, 44th 
Cong., 2d sess, House Executive Document No. 30 (551755), pp. 134-135. 
7Robert Kyte to Alphonso Taft, December 23, 1876, 44th Cong., 2d 
sess, House Executive Document No. 30 (551755), pp. 144-146; E.J. Davis 
to Alphonso Taft, September 9, 1876, 44th Cong., 2d sess, House 
Executive Document No. 30 (551755), pp. 142-143; J.N. Baughman to 
Attorney General of the United States, January 13, 1875, 44th Cong., 2d 
sess, House Executive Document No. 30 (551755), pp. 133-134. 
8Kyte to Taft, December 23, 1876, 44th Cong., 2d sess, House 
Executive Document No. 30 (551755), pp. 144-146. 
9Ibid. 
10Davis to Taft, September 9, 1876, 44th Cong., 2d sess, House 
Executive Document No. 30 (551755), pp. 142-143. 
84 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I. PRIMARY SOURCES 
Unpublished 
Davis, Edmund J. Letters. Governors• Correspondence. Archives, Texas 
State Library, Austin, Texas. 
Hamilton, Andrew J. Letters. Governors• Correspondence. Archives, 
Texas State Library. 
Papers, 1850-1907. Archives, University of Texas Library. 
Pease, Elisha M. Letters. Governors• Correspondence. Archives, Texas 
State Library. 
Records of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, 
1865-1870. Record Group 105. National Archives. Washington, D.C. 
Records of the Fifth Military District, 1867-1870. Record Group 393. 
National Archives. 
Ritual and Charter for the Knights of the White Camelia. George A. 
Rouser. Papers, 1860-1884. Archives, Texas State Library. 
Rouser, George A. Papers, 1860-1884. Archives, Texas State Library. 
Throckmorton, James W. Letters. Governors• Correspondence. Archives, 
Texas State Library. 
Papers, 1838-1889. Archives, University of Texas Library. 
Published 
Federal Writers• Project. 11 The Slave Narratives: A Folk History of 
Slavery in the United States From Interviews with Former Slaves ... 
Texas Narratives, vol. XVI, pts. 1-4. Washington, D.C. Works 
85 
Projects Administration, 1941. Books, Oklahoma State University 
Library. 
Newspapers 
Daily Austin Republican, (Austin, Texas}, 1865-1875. 
Flake•s Daily Bulletin, (Galveston, Texas}, 1865-1872. 
New York Times, (New York City, New York}, 1865-1877. 
Richmond Enquirer and Examiner, (Richmond, Virginia}, 1865-1870. 
San Antonio Daily Express, (San Antonio, Texas}, 1865-1868. 
Texas Republican, (Marshall, Texas}, 1865-1868. 
Published Proceedings and Reports 
86 
U.S. Commissioner of the Freedmen•s Bureau. Report of the Commissioner 
of the Freedmen•s Bureau, 1865. House Execut1ve Documents. 
UOcument no. 11, 39th Cong:;-Tst Sess., 1865. Serial 1255. 
Report of the Commissioner of the Freedmen•s Bureau, 1866. 
House Executive-oocuments. Document:no:-1, vol. III, pt. 1, ~ 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1866. Serial 1285 . 
. Report of the Commissioner of the Freedmen•s Bureau, 1867. 
------~Ro_u_s~e Executive-nocuments. Document:no:-1, vol. III, pt. 1, 4Utn 
tong., zd sess., 1868. serial 1324. 
Report of the Commissioner of the Freedmen•s Bureau, 1868. 
Rouse Executive-nocuments. Document:no:-1, vol. III, pt. 1, 40th 
Con., 3d Sess., 1868. Serial 1367 • 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Freedmen•s Bureau, 1869. 
-----~Ho~u~s~e Executive-nocuments. Document:no:-1, vol. I, pt. 2, 41~ 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1869. Serial 1412. 
U.S. Freedmen•s Bureau. Black Codes. Senate Executive Documents. 
Document no. 6, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1867. Serial 1276. 
. Circulars and General Orders. House Executive Documents. 
-----~Do~c~u~ment no. 70, 39tn Cong., 1st Sess., 1866. Serial 1256. 
• General Orders--Reconstruction. House Executive Documents. 
-----~Do~c~u~ment no. 342, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1870. Serial 1346. 
87 
Reports of the Assistant Commissioners of the Freedmen's 
Bureau. Senate EXecutive Documents. Document no.-zi, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1866. Serial 1238. 
U.S. House of Representatives. Communications from Governor-Elisha M~ 
Pease Re1ative to the Troubles in that Sta~Texas1. House 
M1scellaneous Documents. Document~ 127, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1868. Serial 1350. 
• Conditions of Affairs in Texas. House Executive Documents. 
--'~'~"bo~c~u~ment no. 61, 39tfi Cong., 2dSess., 1867. Seri a 1 1292. 
Report bf the Joint Committee on Reconstruction •. House 
Reports. Report:no:-30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1866. Serial 1273. 
Report of the Joint Select Committee to Inquire into the 
Conditions of Af1alr5 in the Late Insurrectionary States:--House 
Reports. Report no. 2~ pt. ~2d Cong., 2d Sess., 1872. Serial 
1529. 
. The Burning of Brenham, Texas. House Executive Documents. 
--'I':"'Do_c_u-mentno. 145, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 1871. Serial 1460. 
. Use of the Army in certain of the Southern States. House 
--.,...Ex_e_c-utive Documents-:-Document no. 30, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876. 
Serial 1755. 
U. S. Senate. Report and Testimony of the Select Committee of the 
United States Senate to Investigate the Causes of the Removal of 
the Negroes from the ~uthern States-rQ the Nortfiern-states. 
~ate Repor~ Report no. 693, pt. ~4bth Cong., 2d Sess., 1880. 
Serial 1899. 
Report of the Committee £.!:!_ Affairs ..:!..!!. the t.ate 
Insurrectionary States. Senate Reports. Report no. 41, 42d Cong., 
zd sess., 1872. Serial 1496. 
Report of the Committee on Affairs in the t.ate 
Insurrectionary-states. Senate Reports. Letter Reprint. 42d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1872. Serial 1541. 
III. SECONDARY SOURCES 
Unpublished Theses and Dissertations 
Fennell, Romey. "The Negro in Texas Politics, 1865-1874." M.A. thesis, 
North Texas State University, 1963. 
Keener, Charles V. "Racial Turmoil in Texas, 1865-1874." M.S. thesis, 
88 
North Texas State University, 1971. 
Richter, Wi 11 i am L. "The Army in Texas During Reconstruction, 
1865-1870." Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1971. 
Shook, Robert W. "Federal Occupation and Administration of Texas, 
1865-1870" Ph.D. dissertation, North Texas State University, 1970. 
Periodicals 
Carpenter, John A. "Atrocities in the Reconstruction Period." Journal 
of Negro History, XLVII (October, 1962), 234-247. 
Elliott, Claude. "The Freedmen's Bureau in Texas." Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, LVI (July, 1952), 1-24. 
Field, William T., Jr. "The Texas State Police, 1870-1873." Texas 
Military History, V (Fall, 1965), 139-141. 
Shook, Robert W. "The Federal Military in Texas, 1865-1870." Texas 
Military History, VI (Spring, 1967), 3-53. 
Wood, W. D. "The Ku Klux Klan." Quarterly of the Texas State 
Historical Association, IX (April, 19061:262-268. 
Books 
Barr, Alwyn. Black Texans: A History of Negroes in Texas 1528-1971. 
Austin: Jenkins Publishing Company, The Pemberton Press, 1973. 
Brewster, James. Sketches of Southern Mystery, Treason and Murder: The 
Secret Political Soc1e1Tes of the South, The1r MethOdS and Manne~ 
the Phagerdenic Cancer of Our National Life. New York:~MS Press, 
a975. --- --
Buck, Paul Herman. The Road to Reunion, 1865-1900. Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company,-rgj8-. 
Burger, Nask K. and Bettersworth, John K. South of Appomattox. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959. -
Chalmers, David Mark. Hooded Americanism: the First Century of the Ku 
Klux Klan, 1865-1965. Garden City,~w York: Doubleday:-1965. 
Coulter, Ellis Merton. The South During Reconstruction, 1865-1877. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1947. 
Cox, LaWanda C. (Fenlason) and Cox, John H. Politics, Principle, and 
Prejudice, 1865-1866: Dilemma of Reconstruct1on Amer1ca. New--
York: Free Press of Glencoe, 19b3. 
Cruden, Robert. The Negro in Reconstruction. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentlce-Hall-,-1969. 
Deleon, Arnalda. The Mexican Image in Nineteenth Century Texas. 
Boston, Massachusetts: Amer1can~ress, 1982. 
89 
DuBois, W. E. B. Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a 
History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the-xttempt to -
Reconstruct-nemocracy 1n Amer1ca~60-l880.--New York, Antheneum, 
1970. --
Horn, Stanley F. 
1866-1871. 
Invisible Empire: The Story of the Ku Klux Klan, 
Boston, Massachusetts=- Haughton Miff1Tn Company, 1939. 
Jordan, Terry G. Immigration to Texas. Boston, Massachusetts: 
American Press, 1980. --
Kendrick, Benjamin Burks. The Journal of the Joint Committees of 
Fifteen on ReconstructiOn, 39th Congress,-r865-1867. New YOrk: 
Columbiauniversity, 1972. --
McDonough, James L. 
Reconstruction. 
1972. 
Schofield: Union General in the Civil War and 
Tallahassee: Florida State UmversityPress, 
McPherson, Edward. The Political History of the United States of 
America daring the Period of Reconstruct10n (from Apri1 15-,-1865 -
July 15, 1870} .washington; D.C.: Ph1l and 'SOiomors, 1871.--
Moneyhon, Carl H. Republicanism in Reconstruction Texas. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1~0. ---
Pierce, Paul Skeels. The Freedmen's Bureau: A Chapter in the History of 
Reconstruction. Iowa City, Iowa: The Universlty,-r9~ 
Ramsdell, Charles William. Reconstruction In Texas. New York: 
Col urnhi a University, 1910. 
Richardson, Rupert Norval. Texas: The lone Star State. New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943. 
Rosenbaum, Robert J. The History of Mexican Americans in Texas. 
Boston, Massachusetts: American Press, 1980. 
Sefton, James E. The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877. 
(Baton Rouge:--rou1s1ana State Unlvers1ty Press, 1967. 
90 
Shenton, James Patrick. The Reconstruction: A Documentary History of 
the South after the War: 1865-1877. New-York: Putnam, 1963. -
Simkins, Francis Butler. The South Old and New, A History 1820-1947. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949:--- -
Smallwood, James M. Time of Hope, Time of Despair: Blac~ Texans During 
Reconstracti on. J50'rtwaSliTrigt~New York: Kemn Kat Press, 1981. 
Stampp, Kenneth M. The Era of Reconstruction. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1965. 
Sterling, Dorothy, editor. The Trouble They Seen: Black People tell 
the Story of ReconstructTOn. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
ID6. -
Thian, Raphael P. Notes Illustrating the Military Geography of the 
United States, 1813-1880. Edited by John M. Carroll. Austin, 
Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979. 
Trelease, Allen W. White Terror: the Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and 
Soathern Reconstruction. New York:- Harper and Row, 1971.---
Wallace, Ernest. The Howlinz of the Coyotes: Reconstruction Efforts to 
Divide Texas. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 
1979. 
APPENDIX' 
Maps 
91 
.,,,.:, 
MtXICO 
Figure 1. 
.· 
~--·-·~ .. 
EASTERN AND CENTRA( 
TEXAS 
ETHNIC CIVIL WAR POPULATIONS~ 
92 
/ 
' 
' 
,. 
MEXICO 
Figure 2. 
1 
.r---.. 
EASTERN AND CENTRAL 
TEXAS 
KU KLUX KLAN KLAVERNS FORMED IN 1866 
'. 
93 
I' 
·' , 
MtXICO 
Figure 3. 
EASTERN AND 
TEXAS 
J 
CENTRAL 
NEW KU KLUX KLAN KLAVERNS FORMED IN 1867 
,. 
Klaverns in Jack and Parker Counties may have formed as early as 1866. 
~'"·/. 
... , 
... ,. 
Iff' .. I 
,,.,.,,.:, 
MCXlal 
'V.I~ 
.. ,,·,,, 
P.r. 11J.f' 
.,. 
'r ~~~I 
;.acuca 
_,.. ..... . 
EASTERN AND CENTRAL 
TEXAS 
Figure 4. NEW KU KLUX KLAN KLAVERNS FORMED_.IK 1868 
,,. 
... · .. 
Possibly one Klavern controlled Goliad and Victoria Counties 
9~ 
I 
' 
.. 
. 
'\ 
:-,.,,.:. 
MtxiCO 
Figure 5. 
J 
EASTERN AND CENTRAl 
TEXAS 
COUNTIES RECOGNIZED BY ALLEN W. _TR£LEASE 
96 
\ 
.. ( 
MCXICO 
Figure 6. 
EASTERN 
.r---... 
AND 
TEXAS 
CENTRA[ 
TOTAL COUNTY COMPOSITE OF KU KLUX KLAN ACTIVITY 
.··:· 
97_ 
VITA 
Barbara Leah Clayton 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
Thesis: THE LONE STAR CONSPIRACY: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND KU KLUX KLAN 
TERROR IN POST-CIVIL WAR TEXAS, 1865-1877 
Major Field: History 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Wichita, Kansas, October 19, 1951, the 
daughter of Edwin Harrell Clayton and Martha Laverne Frazee; 
married John Herschel Barnhill July 19, 1980; one son, 
William Bryant Barnhill, born in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
July 25, 1984. 
Education: Graduated from East Central High School, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, May 1969; attended The University of Tulsa, 
1969-1970; ·received the Associate of Applied Science degree 
in Medical Laboratory Technology from Tulsa Junior College in 
May, 1973; received the Associate of Arts degree in History 
from Tulsa Junior College in May, 1977; received the Bachelor 
of Arts degree in History from Oklahoma State University in 
May, 1979; completed requirements for the Master of Arts 
degree at Oklahoma State University in July, 1986. 
Professional Experience: Medical Laboratory Technician, Hillcrest 
Medical Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1972-1977; graduate teaching 
assistant, Department of History, Oklahoma State University, 
1979-1981; Medical Technologist, Department of Veterinary 
Pathology, Oklahoma State University, 1981-1983; Assistant 
Supervisor, Central Oklahoma Medical Laboratory, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, 1983-1984; Laboratory Manager, D. Richard 
Ishmael, M.D., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 1984 to present. 
Professional Organizations: American Society of Clinical 
Pathologists; Phi Alpha Theta Historical Society; Historian, 
Phi Alpha Theta Historical Society; Friends of the Forms 
Philosophy Club. 
